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Abstract 
 
Rational and intuitive cognitive styles represent two typical manners of acquiring, 
organizing, and processing information. Rational style is data-driven, slow, and detailed. 
Intuitive style is feelings-driven, fast, and global. People have a stable preference for one style 
over the other and style underlies such processes as decision making (Leonard, Scholl, & 
Kowalski, 1999). The present study took the perspective that cognitive style is an individual 
difference upon which members of a decision making team may vary and that diversity in 
cognitive style is related to team processes and outcomes. Specifically, it was hypothesized that 
diversity in cognitive style would increase task and affective conflict, lead to lowered similarity 
of teammate’s cognitive representations of task information, but ultimately, improve team 
performance over that of less diverse teams. Teammate’s perspective taking ability was 
hypothesized as a moderating variable. The hypotheses were tested using three-person teams 
who completed a complex decision making task in a laboratory setting. Linear regression and 
hierarchical moderated multiple regression were used to test the hypotheses. No support was 
found for the hypothesized relationships. One explanation could be that the research context and 
task deviated too much from past research to be analogous. Several results supported previous 
research findings. Contributions and future research ideas are discussed.   
  
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Cognitive Style Diversity in Decision Making Teams ................................................................... 1 
Cognitive Style................................................................................................................................ 3 
Measurement. .......................................................................................................................... 5 
Intuitive style. ......................................................................................................................... 6 
Rational style. ......................................................................................................................... 7 
Cognitive Style and Influences on Decision Making ................................................................. 8 
Summary. ................................................................................................................................ 9 
Cognitive Style Diversity in Teams ................................................................................................ 9 
Diversity in Teams .................................................................................................................... 11 
Conflict. ................................................................................................................................ 13 
Development of schema congruence. ................................................................................... 15 
Performance. ......................................................................................................................... 17 
Perspective Taking as a Moderator ............................................................................................... 18 
Perspective Taking. ................................................................................................................... 19 
Method .......................................................................................................................................... 22 
Participants ................................................................................................................................ 22 
Task ........................................................................................................................................... 22 
Measures ................................................................................................................................... 23 
Cognitive style. ..................................................................................................................... 23 
Perspective taking. ................................................................................................................ 24 
Task conflict.......................................................................................................................... 24 
Affective conflict. ................................................................................................................. 24 
Task schema congruence. ..................................................................................................... 24 
Team performance. ............................................................................................................... 26 
Procedure .................................................................................................................................. 27 
Results ........................................................................................................................................... 29 
Preliminary Scale Analyses ...................................................................................................... 29 
Aggregation to Team Level ...................................................................................................... 30 
Cognitive style. ..................................................................................................................... 30 
Task conflict.......................................................................................................................... 31 
Affective conflict. ................................................................................................................. 33 
Perspective taking. ................................................................................................................ 33 
Tests of Hypotheses .................................................................................................................. 34 
iv 
 
Post-Hoc Analyses .................................................................................................................... 37 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................... 38 
Contributions............................................................................................................................. 44 
Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 46 
Future Research ........................................................................................................................ 48 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 51 
List of References ......................................................................................................................... 53 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................... 67 
Appendix B ................................................................................................................................... 91 
Appendix C ................................................................................................................................... 94 
Appendix D ................................................................................................................................... 95 
Vita .............................................................................................................................................. 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1. Variable inter-correlations ............................................................................................. 96 
Table 2. Hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity on task conflict controlling for the 
mean effect of cognitive style ........................................................................................................ 96 
Table 3. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on 
task conflict ................................................................................................................................... 97 
Table 4. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on 
affective conflict ............................................................................................................................ 97 
Table 5. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on 
schema congruence ....................................................................................................................... 97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between types of diversity, conflict, and the development of schema 
congruence .................................................................................................................................... 98 
Figure 2. Interaction of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on affective conflict ..... 99 
1 
 
Cognitive Style Diversity in Decision Making Teams 
Organizations frequently use teams for decision making tasks. A common example is a 
task force made of individuals drawn together to make decisions about organizational problems 
(Sundstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, 1990). By definition, a team is two or more individuals 
working interdependently toward a common goal (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). Therefore, a 
decision making team can be defined as two or more individuals working interdependently with 
the goal of making a decision.  
 There are many reasons why an organization would elect to use teams rather than 
individuals to make decisions. Teams may be employed when it is believed that in order to 
produce the highest quality solution multiple perspectives on the problem are needed (Guzzo & 
Dickson, 1996).  Alternatively, one person may not hold all of the requisite knowledge or 
expertise to most effectively render a decision for a complex problem (Scholten, van 
Knippenberg, Nijstad, & DeDreu, 2007). The adage “two heads are better than one” sums up the 
notion that teams of individuals have the capability to make higher quality decisions than 
individuals working alone (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996).   
 Many factors contribute to the success or failure of teams. A simplistic way to understand 
the complexity of teams is to think of them in terms of the Input-Process-Output (IPO) model 
(Hackman, 1987). This model outlines three interrelated aspects of teams and performance. 
Inputs are initially existing aspects of the team. These could be individual team member 
characteristics, organizational resources, or the team’s task. Processes are the transformation of 
inputs that ultimately produces the team’s outputs. Processes include coordination, conflict, or 
the development of team cohesion. Outputs (also called outcomes) are the result of the team’s 
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processes and can be the team’s product, such as a final decision in a decision making team, or 
other outcomes such as team viability, trust, or satisfaction with the team’s performance.  
The present study is focused on a single individual difference input and its effects on 
team processes and outcomes. The specific individual difference of interest is cognitive style. 
This is relevant to decision making teams because cognitive style is the manner in which 
individuals gather and assess information. When applied in a decision context it can be defined 
as "…the learned, habitual response pattern exhibited by an individual when confronted with a 
decision situation. It is not a personality trait, but a habit-based propensity to react in a certain 
way in a specific decision context...” (Scott & Bruce, 1995, p. 820). On a team, each member 
will bring to the team his or her own “habit-based propensity.” This will interact with the other 
teammate’s cognitive styles and with other input variables to produce team processes. These 
processes will then result in a final decision or outcome.  
Teammates may enter the decision making scenario with cognitive styles that are similar 
or dissimilar to the other team members. The team composition and diversity research suggests 
that the extent to which teammates are similar on such individual characteristics will affect team 
processes and outcomes. Although team diversity is not a nascent area of study, the research on 
cognitive style diversity in teams is sparse and empirical work is almost non-existent. The effects 
of cognitive style diversity on teams are unknown. Therefore, the goal of the present study is to 
determine how cognitive style diversity affects decision making teams’ processes and outcomes. 
Specifically, cognitive style diversity was expected to influence team member conflict, 
performance, and the team’s ability to develop cognitive congruence regarding the task. The 
present study will contribute to at least two areas of research and will represent an initial attempt 
to bridge the two streams empirically. First, it will extend the cognitive style research by going 
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beyond the individual level to assess cognitive style at the team level. Second, it will answer 
calls in the team diversity literature to move beyond demographic diversity toward cognitive 
types of diversity (van Kippenberg & Schippers, 2007), and to move beyond proxy measures of 
underlying diversity (such as using nationality as a proxy measure of value differences) toward 
more direct measures.  The following review will therefore cover the construct and relevant 
findings associated with cognitive style and also the literature on team composition/diversity. It 
will conclude with hypotheses specific to cognitive diversity effects on decision making teams.   
Cognitive Style  
In the past few centuries, advances in scientific theory and practice have been able to 
show that individuals differ in the way they gather and process information (Robey & Taggart, 
1981) and the term “cognitive style” has been used to label such differences. Cognitive style has 
received theoretical attention in the education, career, and management literatures (Kozhevnikov, 
2007). The construct has been popularized by recent interest in the role of “intuition” in 
managerial decision making (Sadler-Smith, 2004) and with the notion that it may be useful as a 
selection or placement tool. Research on cognitive style is of value to organizations due to its 
conceptual distinction from cognitive ability, the notion that cognitive styles may differ in their 
applicability to various problems, and the possibility of creating teams with an optimal mix of 
styles for particular organizational needs. The following review will offer a definition of 
cognitive style including its dimensions, review relevant measurement techniques, and discuss 
literature findings. 
Cognitive Style Construct 
The cognitive style construct has been of interest to researchers for decades (Robey & 
Taggart, 1981). It has been found to influence turnover when a misfit between style and the 
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demands of the job are present (Chan, 1996). Differences in cognitive style have been related to 
leader-member exchange relationships (Allinson, Armstrong, & Hayes, 2001), team leader 
behavior (Armstrong & Priola, 2001), teaching style (Evans, Harkins, & Young, 2008), 
entrepreneurship characteristics (Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & Whitcanack, 2009), decisiveness 
(Hough & ogilvie, 2005), and risk assessment in decision making (Henderson & Nutt, 1980).  
It has been described using a several typologies [e.g., Adaptors- Innovators (Kirton, 
1976); Convergers, Divergers, Assimilators (Kolb, 1976); Sensing-Feeling, Thinking-Perceiving 
(Jung, 1971)] but there is considerable consensus on several points. Most researchers agree that 
cognitive style is stable within person and that it refers to how individuals acquire and process 
information (Kozhevnikov, 2007). For example, Allinson and Hayes (1996) defined cognitive 
style as being a stable characteristic associated with how people process and organize 
information. Similarly, Rayner and Riding (1997) defined "…cognitive style as a person's typical 
or habitual mode of problem solving, thinking, perceiving and remembering" (p. 6). Ruble and 
Cosier (1990) noted, "the term "cognitive styles" has been used in a generic sense to refer to 
individual differences in the way people process information to make decisions" (p. 283). 
Cognitive style also encompasses information gathering approaches in addition to information 
processing (Vance, Groves, Paik, & Kindler, 2007). That is, cognitive style influences the type 
of data attended to and preferred. Leonard, Scholl, and Kowalski (1999) suggested that these 
cognitive differences also influence judgments and ultimately decision making behavior. The 
definition of cognitive style used in the present study represents a synthesis of these ideas.  
Cognitive style is defined here as:  
Cognitive style is an individual’s typical manner of acquiring, organizing, and 
processing information. It is habitual, relatively stable across time and situations, 
influences preferences, and underlies behavior including decision making.  
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Measurement. In an early review of the measurement techniques used in the cognitive 
style literature, Robey and Taggart (1981) identified several methods. They categorized these 
methods as being physiological such as electroencephalograms (EEG) and skin conduction tests, 
behavioral such as time required to complete a task, eye-movements, and trained observer 
ratings of behavior, and self-reported style. Self reported style is one of the most popular 
methods for assessing cognitive style because of the inherent difficulties associated with the 
other methods. For example, it is cumbersome and expensive to assess a large number of 
individuals’ brain waves with an EEG. Similarly cumbersome to administer are timed 
assessments or measures that must be sent for proprietary scoring. Thus, many researchers have 
attempted to create paper-and-pencil measures with straight-forward scoring systems to assess 
cognitive style.  
Among the instruments designed or used to measure cognitive style in a self-report 
format are: the Linear Nonlinear Thinking Styles Profile (LNTSP; Vance et al., 2007), the 
Judgment and Perceptions scales of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (e.g., Hough & ogilvie, 
2005; Ruble & Cosier, 1990), Embedded Figures Test, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory, Kolb’s Learning Style Inventory (see Robey & Taggart, 1981), Kirton’s Adaptation-
Innovation scale (Chan, 1996), Problem Solving Styles Questionnaire (Tepper, Tetrault, Braun, 
& Romero, 1993), and in an attempt to integrate previous work and to develop a measure that 
could be used in a managerial context, Allinson and Hayes’s (1996) Cognitive Styles Index 
(CSI).   
Due to the number of measures used to assess cognitive style, several attempts have been 
made to uncover the relationships between the measures to determine their construct validity 
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Tepper et al., 1993; Vance et al., 2007). Some studies have shown that 
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the measures correlated in expected ways. For example, linear thinking from the LNTSP was 
positively correlated with higher rational thinking scores on the CSI (Vance et al., 2007). 
However, other studies have found mixed support for hypothesized relationships (Tepper et al., 
1993). Differences between the measures on such features as context specified in the directions 
and response format may be partially responsible for the lack of stronger interrelationships 
between measures.  
Despite somewhat mixed empirical support, several researchers have argued that overlap 
exists in the various conceptualizations of cognitive style and that on the whole, many are 
consistent with the dual-brain (left-right hemisphere) concept (Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Ridding 
& Cheema, 1991; Sadler-Smith, 1998). This is a general theory of cognition suggesting that the 
two hemispheres of the brain (right and left) contribute differently to the way people process 
information and that people inherently favor one side over the other. It has typically been 
discussed as the idea that people have a tendency toward being right-brained or intuitive versus 
left-brained or analytical (Robey & Taggart, 1981). Based on these arguments and on some of 
the above findings suggesting overlap in cognitive style measures (Allinson & Hayes, 1996; 
Vance et al., 2007), the present study was based on the position that there are two basic cognitive 
styles (intuitive and rational), that most people tend to prefer one over the other, and that the 
preferred style affects information acquisition and processing.  
Intuitive style. Right-brain driven information processing has been referred to as 
“intuitive”, “holistic”, and “non-linear.”  In general, this style of thinking has been described as 
being based on internal feelings, a big-picture approach, low amounts of external data gathering, 
and fast, intuition-based decision making. For example, Hough and ogilvie wrote, “Intuitive 
processes are fast, associative, and use low-effort heuristics.” (p. 426, 2005). Allinson and Hayes 
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(1996) noted that left-brained or intuitive terminology, "…refers to immediate judgment based 
on feelings and the adoption of a global perspective" (p. 122). Vance et al. (2007) stated, 
“Holistic in nature, intuition is often the result of an automatic and unconscious assessment of 
the interrelated parts of a nonlinear system that scans the integrated “big picture” to point to 
appropriate decisions and new directions, rather than getting delayed and lost in the detailed 
analysis of a huge set of data” (p. 169).  
In a study of self-managed work teams, it was found that intuitives, relative to rationals, 
were more often selected as the leader by team members. Additionally, the intuitive leaders, as 
compared to the rational leaders, initiated more socio-emotionally oriented and task-oriented acts 
(Armstrong & Priola, 2001). Intuitives were found to have higher entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
for intentions toward entrepreneurship and identifying entrepreneurial opportunities than 
rationals (Kickul et al. , 2009). Intuitive style has also been found to predict innovativeness 
whereas an analytic style did not (Scott & Bruce, 1995).  Furthermore, those with a style 
favoring internal information sources and a non-linear processing approach (right-brain) were 
more likely to report that they use emotions to facilitate thinking (Groves & Vance, 2009).  
Rational style. Left-brained led information processing, on the other hand, has been 
called “analytic”, “rational”, and “linear.” In general, it is characterized by a thorough search for 
facts and data, deliberate, logical information processing, and a focus on problem details when 
decision making. For example, Hough and ogilvie (2005) described “Analytical processes…are 
slow, rule-based, and depend on high-effort systematic reasoning” (p. 426). Allison and Hayes 
(1996) stated that right-brained, rational thinking "…refers to judgment based on mental 
reasoning and a focus on detail" p. 122. Moreover, Vance et al. (2007) defined “linear thinking 
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style as a preference for attending to external data and facts, and processing this information 
through conscious logic and rational thinking…” (p. 170, italics in original).  
In a study of school teachers rational/analytics had a teaching style that focused more on 
structure, rules, organization, planning, and rational thought than on individuality, inter-personal, 
or social elements (Evans, Harkins, & Young, 2008). Rational thinkers were found to have 
higher entrepreneurial self-efficacy for planning, marshalling resources, and implementing 
activities than did intuitives (Kickul et al., 2009). Having a rational style was found to predict an 
internal locus-of-control (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Rationals were found to prefer work 
environments with structure, routine, and logic (Allinson & Hayes, 1996). Furthermore, those 
with a style favoring external sources of data and a linear processing approach (left-brained) 
reported higher abilities to regulate their emotions than did those with an intuitive style (Groves 
& Vance, 2009).  
Cognitive Style and Influences on Decision Making 
 As mentioned above, and in the definition of cognitive style for the present study, 
cognitive style influences decision making (Leonard et al., 1999; Ruble & Cosier, 1990). 
Because cognitive style affects information gathering, organization, and processing, and 
influences perceptions and judgment it affects an individual’s decision making approach.  For 
example, when attempting to acquire information relevant to making a decision, cognitive style 
affects the amount of time spent gathering data, the type of information attended to, and the 
amount of information deemed necessary for a full grasp of the issue (Scott & Bruce, 1995; 
Vance et al., 2007). Cognitive style will be associated with organizing and processing the 
acquired information in a global, holistic way, versus a compartmentalized and detailed way 
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Hough & ogilvie, 2005; Vance et al., 2007). Cognitive style is also 
purported to determine partially the number of alternative solutions generated to solve a problem 
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and/or the number of alternative options considered for a decision (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Also, 
the speed with which a final solution is adopted has been attributed to cognitive style (see Robey 
& Taggart, 1989). Therefore, differences between individuals’ in their cognitive style should also 
manifest in the way they make decisions.  
Summary.  Cognitive style represents an underlying approach to gathering, organizing, 
and processing information. Two styles: rational and intuitive are the focus of the present study. 
People inherently prefer using one style over the other and this tendency is relatively stable 
across situations and over time. Additionally, cognitive style underlies everyday perception and 
judgment, and, therefore, it also influences behavior including decision making. The aim of the 
present study was to examine the relationships between cognitive style diversity and team 
processes and outcomes. Although little empirical research has been conducted in the area of 
cognitive style diversity, research has investigated other types of diversity in teams.  This body 
of literature is helpful in understanding the general effects of various types of diversity on teams 
and contributes to a framework for hypothesizing the effects of cognitive style diversity on 
decision making teams.  
Cognitive Style Diversity in Teams 
There is a lengthy history of research investigating the effects of various types of 
diversity on work teams (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Webber & Donahue, 2001). Recently 
researchers have called for investigations into the effects of cognitive types of diversity in teams 
(van Kippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Sadler- Smith (1998) recognized the importance of 
considering cognitive style in a team context and stated that little is known about how members 
with different cognitive styles will interact. Specifically, elements to consider include how 
cognitive style diversity will affect conflict, interpersonal relationships, problem solving 
10 
 
effectiveness, and the ability to reach a consensus. Some researchers (Hough & ogilvie, 2005) 
have suggested that although diversity in cognitive style will lead to interpersonal difficulties, it 
will ultimately lead to improved performance. To date, there are few studies investigating the 
effects of cognitive style diversity in teams.  
Volkema and Gorman (1998) found no clear effects of cognitive style diversity on 
decision making teams using the Winter Survival task. In a small sample (three teams) Priola, 
Smith, and Armstrong (2004) found relationships between cognitive style diversity and 
outcomes. Specifically, the homogenous intuitive team took a "feeling" approach, did not get the 
correct solution, but had high cohesiveness. The homogenous rational team took an organized 
approach, found the correct solution, and the members were satisfied with the team’s 
interactions. Furthermore, the heterogeneous cognitive style team was unsatisfied with its 
process, found the correct solution, but some members were displeased with the decision of the 
group. Other researchers have similarly suggested that high cognitive style diversity teams would 
suffer interpersonally but would outperform homogenous teams. For example, Hough and 
ogilvie (2005) stated, “…team member cognitions may interact … to create a balance of 
complementary styles resulting in a more robust approach to decision making” (p.443). 
 The small body of research specifically addressing cognitive style diversity in teams 
provides little direction for forming hypotheses in the present study. However, the extensive 
literature on team composition/diversity in a more general sense can offer guidance. By 
organizing the literature on diversity in teams, it is possible to show how cognitive style diversity 
may affect teams in ways similar to other, related types of diversity. Therefore, the next section 
will offer a framework for organizing the broad diversity literature and suggest a place within 
that framework that cognitive style diversity fits. Then, the findings on analogous types of 
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diversity will be reviewed in an attempt to inform hypotheses regarding cognitive style diversity. 
Specific hypotheses regarding conflict, the development of schema congruence, and performance 
will be advanced.  
Diversity in Teams 
 The study of diversity’s effects on teams is complex because diversity can be 
conceptualized in myriad ways. Furthermore, the expected relationships between diversity and 
team processes and outcomes are dependent upon how diversity is conceptualized. For this 
reason, researchers have offered typologies to differentiate types of diversity and to facilitate 
understanding of how diversity affects teams (Pelled, 1996; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Figure 
1 provides a summary of the frameworks that have been advanced for categorizing diversity 
variables and the direction of relationships that would be expected between different types of 
diversity, conflict, and the development of schema congruence. The purpose of this section is to 
categorize cognitive style diversity as a function of established typologies, to review the 
literature available for types of diversity which are parallel to cognitive style, and to extrapolate 
from those findings, hypotheses for the effects of cognitive style diversity on team conflict and 
schema congruence.  
 Figure 1 shows two primary distinctions between types of diversity. Along the vertical 
axis, diversity is conceptualized as being either “surface” or “deep” level (Pelled, 1996). This 
typology focuses on the extent to which a diversity variable is readily apparent. Examples of 
surface level diversity types are sex, age, and race. Examples of deep level diversity types are 
values, knowledge, and personality. The horizontal axis of Figure 1 displays task relevance as a 
second distinction between types of diversity. This categorization focuses on the extent to which 
the type of diversity under consideration is pertinent to the team’s task. For example, on a 
surgical team, expertise diversity is more germane to the task than is diversity of religious 
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affiliation. On a military team, tenure diversity may impact the team more than would racial 
diversity.   
When visibility (surface or deep) and task relevance are crossed, four quadrants are 
produced. Where the type of diversity falls on these axes determines the general theory of 
diversity that is most applicable. Based on the theoretical perspective that is most applicable, 
different effects on processes and outcomes can be expected. Two primary theories of the effects 
of diversity on teams are also shown in Figure 1 (denoted with the dotted line). Social 
categorization is a theory that suggests people judge others by placing them into various groups 
depending on their characteristics. People then evaluate the similarity of others to themselves 
based on these groupings (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Social 
categorization effects are expected to be strongest when the type of diversity is more “surface” in 
nature (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007)  likely be relatively irrelevant to the team’s task.  
As the type of diversity becomes closer to the lower left quadrant of Figure 1, the 
informational/decision-making theory becomes more applicable. In general, this theory states 
that types of diversity which are deeper in level and more relevant to the task, create a team with 
a greater pool of resources from which to draw when making decisions and solving problems. 
The theory argues that for such tasks as decision making, having diversity on deep, task relevant 
aspects such as knowledge, education, and perspectives will ultimately lead to higher 
performance than teams homogenous on such aspects (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Williams & 
O’Reilly, 1998). Cognitive style diversity is applicable to the information/decision-making 
perspective of diversity for two reasons. First, it is a deep level difference because people cannot 
readily detect the cognitive style of others. Second, it is task relevant because in decision 
making, the manner in which an individual typically gathers, organizes, and processes 
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information has implications for the decision outcome. Because little empirical research has been 
conducted on cognitive style diversity, research on other diversity factors that also fit into the 
same categorization as cognitive style (i.e., the informational/decision-making perspective) will 
be reviewed.  The next section will review the diversity literature relevant to the variables 
depicted in Figure 1 and hypotheses are presented. 
Conflict. Two types of conflict are presented in Figure 1: affective and task. Types of 
diversity that evoke social categorization effects have been consistently posited to produce 
conflict that is affective in nature (Pelled, 1996; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Also called 
“relationship,” “interpersonal,” and “emotional” conflict, affective conflict reflects frustration 
with interpersonal compatibilities, irritation, annoyance, and/or general negative emotions 
toward teammates (Jehn, 1997). Empirical research has supported the notion that the types of 
diversity that elicit social categorization effects lead to affective conflict (Jehn, Northcraft, and 
Neale, 1999; King, Hebl, & Beal, 2009; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). In contrast, the type of 
conflict posited to result from diversity relevant to the information/decision-making perspective 
is task conflict (Pelled, 1996). Whereas affective conflict focuses on interpersonal 
incompatibilities, task conflict is defined as disagreements with regard to viewpoints, opinions, 
and ideas about the task content (Jehn, 1995). Numerous studies have supported the notion that 
deep level, task relevant types of diversity result in task conflict. For example, diversity in work 
experience, educational background (Zellmer-Bruhn, Maloney, Bhappu, & Salvador, 2008), 
informational background (Jehn et al., 1999), and functional background (Pelled et al., 1999) 
have all been found to lead to task conflict.  
Because cognitive style is task relevant for a decision making team and also deep level, it 
should be related to task conflict. A decision making team might experience task conflict related 
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to how to approach or organize the task information, evaluate the importance of information, or 
generate solutions or ideas. Diversity in cognitive style should cause members of the team to 
attempt to approach the task in different ways. For example, an intuitive team member might 
disagree with a rational member’s desire to evaluate thoroughly each piece of information when 
the intuitive member feels the solution is already clear. Likewise, a rational member might be 
skeptical of an intuitive member relying on his or her hunches and feelings regarding the task. 
Therefore, we would expect increased cognitive style diversity to be associated with increased 
conflict about how to approach the task.  
H1a: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and task 
conflict. 
Although the diversity literature points to cognitive style diversity being primarily related 
to task conflict, distinctions between the two facets of conflict are not always clear. In many 
cases researchers have found that task and affective conflict are related. For example, Jehn et al. 
(1999) found that value diversity was related to both task and affective conflict. In a study by 
Pelled et al. (1999), although functional background diversity predicted task conflict and the 
demographic diversity variables (race and tenure) predicted affective conflict, there was a 
significant positive relationship between the two types of conflict. Therefore, although the two 
types can be statistically separated (e.g., with confirmatory factor analysis) there does appear to 
be a considerable interrelationship between them. To illustrate, a recent meta-analysis found an 
overall correlation of .54 between task and affective conflict in teams (De Drue & Weingart, 
2003). It is suspected that the reciprocal relationship between conflict types is due to members’ 
inability to separate mentally criticisms of ideas and approaches (task conflict) from personal 
criticisms (affective conflict). As teammates disagree about how to approach the task, these 
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incompatibilities may bleed into interpersonal feelings. In summary, although surface level, task 
irrelevant types of diversity primarily cause affective conflict and deep level, task relevant types 
of diversity primarily cause task conflict, the two types have consistently been shown to be 
positively related. Due to the high correlations found between task and affective conflict, it is 
also hypothesized that increased cognitive style diversity will be associated with increased 
affective conflict.  
H1b: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and affective 
conflict. 
Development of schema congruence. Figure 1 shows that as the type of diversity 
becomes closer to the lower left quadrant, teams are expected to have greater difficulty 
developing schema congruence. Schemas are mental representations of information and ideas. 
Similarity or congruence can be said to exist among team members when there is substantial 
overlap in the content and organization of these mental representations (Rentsch & Hall, 1994). 
It has been suggested that types of diversity which apply to the informational/decision-making 
perspective impede team members’ ability to develop congruence in the way they understand the 
task and task information. Clark, Anand, and Roberson (2000) stated, “…the same diversity that 
enriches the availability of multiple viewpoints may create difficulties in arriving at shared 
meanings” (p. 212). Cronin and Weingart (2007) suggested that diversity in such factors as 
knowledge, values, or norms, cause team members to hold differing views of how to approach 
the same problem. Due to such differences, team members may attend to and encode different 
aspects or pieces of information regarding the problem. Empirical research has supported these 
notions. Deep level, task relevant diversity variables such as diversity in educational background 
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(Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001) and mental ability (Edwards, Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006) have been 
found to be related to lower schema congruence.  
In general, the information/decision-making perspective on diversity suggests that 
differences in deep level, task relevant variables will ultimately be positive for the team’s 
performance by bringing a variety of unique perspectives to the decision. However, it appears 
that these differences in perspective also cause difficulty communicating and integrating 
information to solve problems (Millikan & Martins, 1996). Communicating about unique 
perspectives and combining information into new ideas are some of the types of team processes 
which have been shown to lead to higher schema congruence (Mello, Rentsch, Delise, 
Staniewicz, & Letsky, 2009). Research and theory has substantiated the notion that types of 
diversity relevant to the informational/decision-making perspective have these effects on these 
types of team processes. For example, Dose and Klimoski’s (1999) work on value diversity 
suggested teams with differing values will have more difficulty reaching consensus due to 
decreased desire to incorporate other’s information and views into their own interpretation of the 
decision. Gebert, Boerner, and Kearney (2006) suggested functional diversity will impede team 
members from engaging in “synergistic communication”, defined as the extent to which 
members’ diverging positions are specified and recombined into new solutions, due to decreased 
ability and desire to share ideas. Empirical results follow from these theories. For example, 
differences in knowledge and experience created difficulty between team members in 
communication and understanding each other, and was found to relate to low amounts of 
information sharing within the team (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Educational background 
diversity had a negative linear relationship with the team’s ability to integrate task information 
(Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005). In summary, when teams are diverse with respect to deep 
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level, task relevant variables such as knowledge, values, or cognitive style, their ability to 
perform such processes as sharing and integrating task information is impeded, which ultimately 
increases the difficulty for members to develop similar schemas.  
Cognitive style diversity would be expected to interfere with members’ ability to develop 
similar schemas for several reasons. When people differ in the way they assess, organize, and 
process information, they will differ in their overall interpretation of that information. They may 
differ in what they see as important or relevant, and how they cognitively categorize the 
information. This will create difficulty in communicating about the task and inhibit team 
members’ ability to relate similarly to the information and task. The present study addressed 
cognitive style diversity effects on task schema congruence. Therefore, the focus was on 
similarity between team members’ schemas about the task information. 
H2: There will be a negative linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and the 
development of task schema congruence. 
Performance. The primary tenant of the informational/decision-making perspective on 
diversity is that diverse teams are expected to increase performance over that of homogenous 
teams because the overall pool of resources is greater (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Williams & 
O’Reilly, 1998). On a decision making team, diversity on deep level, task relevant variables 
should produce a team with various viewpoints, perspectives, and approaches to the decision. 
This should create a scenario where the team takes a robust approach to the task and ultimately 
has better performance outcomes than would a homogenous team. Research on other deep level, 
task relevant diversity factors have been shown to improve certain performance metrics (Pelled, 
1996). For example, Jehn et al. (1999) found that when tasks were complex, such as decision 
making tasks, informational diversity predicted performance. Rodriguez (1998) found that when 
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teams were charged with a task requiring them to identify, evaluate, and implement a solution to 
organizational issues, value diversity predicted the performance metrics of creativity and 
effectiveness. Additionally, personality diversity in teams has been found to predict customer 
satisfaction and task completion (Neuman, Wagner & Christiansen, 1999). Results of the 
Neuman et al. (1999) study supported the complementary model of diversity. This viewpoint 
suggests that differences between members fit together such that the full spectrum of the 
diversity variable is realized on the team. In short, “… each member adds unique attributes that 
are necessary for the team to be successful” (Neuman et al., 1999, p. 31).  
Cognitive style diversity will increase overall differences in approaches to the task. This 
should create a larger pool of ideas and perspectives and ultimately lead to improved 
performance over that of homogenous teams. Conversely, homogenous teams might be expected 
to lack enough differences in approach to have a well-rounded set of perspectives on the 
decision. For example, a homogenous intuitive team might quickly agree on a course of action, 
but fail to consider fully all the available information. In contrast, a homogenous rational team 
might become so caught up in the details of the information that they become stagnant in 
generating new ideas, or fail to see the larger picture. It is in this way that having diversity in 
cognitive style will create a complement of opinions on how to perform the task, allowing for a 
more robust approach to the decision and ultimately, better performance (Hough & ogilvie, 
2005).  
H3: Cognitive style diversity will have a positive linear relationship with performance. 
Perspective Taking as a Moderator 
 In an attempt to capture aspects of team dynamics beyond those influenced by cognitive 
style diversity, an additional variable was proposed as a moderator. Perspective taking has been 
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identified as an individual difference variable that can affect decision making teams (Kemp & 
Smith, 1994; Falk & Johnson,1977; Johnson, 1977). It has been found to influence information 
exchange, understanding of others’ information, and conflict type. Next, perspective taking is 
defined, relevant empirical findings are reviewed, and hypotheses for moderated relationships 
are presented.  
Perspective Taking. 
 “Perspective taking may be defined as the cognitive process of putting oneself in the 
place of another and understanding how the other thinks about a problem” (Falk & Johnson, 
1977, p. 64). Often studied in the negotiation literature, higher self-reported perspective taking 
has been linked to decisions that are more beneficial to both sides than deals brokered between 
individuals with lower perspective taking (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, &White, 2008; Kemp & 
Smith, 1994).  This was found to be true for not only mean dyad-level perspective taking but also 
for the perspective taking ability of only one team member in a key role (Galinsky et al., 2008). 
Perspective taking has been theorized to relate to non-egocentric behavior that subverts one’s 
own desires to those of the greater group (in this case the team) (Davis, 1983). Furthermore, this 
ability should lead to “smoother and more rewarding interpersonal relationships” (p. 115).  
Perspective taking has also been studied with respect to conflict style and type of conflict 
(e.g., Falk & Johnson, 1977). In a study of conflict style with close friends and family, Rizkalla, 
Wertheim, and Hodgson (2008) found that the ability to take another’s perspective was 
associated with positive styles of conflict. Specifically, high perspective takers, more often than 
low perspective takers, elected to use conflict styles that focused on finding mutually satisfying 
solutions rather than focusing solely on their own interests.   
Perspective taking and conflict has also been studied in work teams. Higher mean team-
level perspective taking in nursing teams was related to perceptions of conflict as task-oriented 
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rather than as relationship-oriented (Sessa, 1996). Thus, perspective taking may alter the 
relationships between cognitive style diversity and task and affective conflict. Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that the willingness and ability to take another team member’s perspective 
on the problem might heighten the benefits of task conflict while minimizing the damage that 
may be caused by affective conflict.  
 Task and affective conflict have different effects on team outcomes. When a team is 
engaged in a non-routine task, task conflict has been suggested to have a positive effect on team 
performance and affective conflict, a negative effect (De Dreu & West, 2001). These 
relationships have been found to hold true for decision making tasks (De Drue & Weingart, 
2003). Because perspective taking has been shown to alter conflict styles (Rizkalla et al., 2008), 
it would be expected to enhance conflict that is beneficial to team outcomes (task conflict) and 
decrease conflict which may be detrimental to team outcomes (affective conflict). Specifically, 
the ability to see the task from others’ perspectives should increase discussions of various 
viewpoints and reasons behind differences of opinion, and generally assist members in exposing 
their task-related conflicts. At the same time, perspective taking should allow members to 
perceive disagreements as purely task-oriented and not as interpersonal attacks (Sessa, 1996). 
Thus, perspective taking should increase the positive effect of cognitive style diversity on task 
conflict and decrease the positive effect of cognitive style diversity on affective conflict.   
H4a: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity 
and task conflict such that the positive relationship will be stronger under conditions of high 
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.  
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H4b: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity 
and affective conflict such that the positive relationship will be weaker under conditions of high 
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.  
Perspective taking has also been found to influence information exchange and 
understanding of others’ information. For example, perspective taking was found to increase 
performance in negotiation tasks where full disclosure of information was crucial to achieving 
high joint profits (Kemp & Smith, 1994). Falk and Johnson (1977) found that higher proportions 
of perspective taking behaviors in groups led to higher quality interactions about task 
information and increased cooperation between members. Similarly, Johnson (1977) found that 
teams instructed in perspective taking created higher quality problem solutions and viewed more 
favorably their teams’ information exchange than did teams using other interaction styles. 
Furthermore, Johnson found that people in the perspective taking condition perceived their team 
as more helpful in presenting information, as more accurately understanding their information, 
and as valuing their information and views more than did members of other conditions. Finally, 
perspective taking behaviors such as inquiring about the reasoning for others’ preferences, 
accepting others’ viewpoints as legitimate, and incorporating others’ perspectives into one’s own 
interpretation have been found to increase cognitive congruence in diverse perspective teams 
(Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001). Because it has been shown to influence understanding of 
another’s information and ideas, perspective taking would be expected to reduce the negative 
effect of cognitive style diversity on the development of task schema congruence.  
H4c: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity 
and task schema congruence such that the negative relationship will be weaker under conditions 
of high perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.  
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Method1 
Participants  
The sample consisted of 126 University of Tennessee psychology undergraduate students 
assigned to 42 three-person teams. One team was unable to complete the task due to equipment 
malfunction. These participants were included in analyses of individual-level variables but were 
excluded from analyses of team-level variables. The sample was 48.4% female, 79.4% Caucasian, 
with an average age of 19.3 years, and 94.4% were born in the United States. Eighty-five percent 
were lower classman (freshman or sophomore). Twenty-nine percent reported holding a job at the 
time of their participation. All of those who reported holding a job worked less than full-time and 
75% reported their job was one of convenience rather than career-oriented.  Participants were 
recruited using the online Human Participants in Research (HPR) system. This system allows 
students to view a description of current studies being conducted at the University of Tennessee and 
to sign up to participate in the study of their choice. Participants received $20 and course credit for 
participating.  
Task  
The task was a simulated military non-combatant rescue mission which required teams to 
plan the evacuation of stranded civilians from a combat area. The task was developed with the use of 
Navy SEALs and the materials included an optimal rescue plan (Biron, Burkman, & Warner, 2008). 
Each team member received general background information (e.g., number of available troops) that 
was held in common by all members. Additionally, members were randomly assigned unique role-
specific information regarding weapons (e.g., artillery specifications), intelligence (e.g., U.S. military 
locations), or environment (e.g., tide levels, fauna). Each team member’s unique information was 
only meaningful in relation to the other members’ unique information and to the general information. 
Therefore, the optimal plan could be achieved only if members shared and integrated common and 
                                                 
1
 Portions of the following section were adapted from Rentsch, Delise, Salas, and Letsky (2010). 
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unique information. Teams were allowed one hour for virtual discussion of the task including 
designing and recording their rescue plan (Biron et al., 2008).  
Measures  
Cognitive style. In order to determine the most appropriate measure of cognitive style for 
use in the present study, a pilot study was conducted to examine several measures (Mello, Scott, 
Delise, Staniewicz, & Rentsch, 2011). A literature search revealed a number of measures purported 
to assess cognitive style or similarly labeled constructs.  The measures varied in their intended 
audience, context, and response formats. The purpose of the pilot study was to uncover relationships 
between the measures, to estimate the psychometric properties of each measure, and to establish 
discriminant and convergent validity evidence. An additional goal was to determine the extent to 
which the measures elicited a social desirability bias. Four self-report style measures were selected. 
The measures were expected to converge with one another on dimensions of rational and intuitive 
style and also to converge with several dimensions of personality, goal orientation, and self-
monitoring. Discriminant variables included the remaining personality dimensions, perspective 
taking, self-esteem, collectivism, and social desirability. Appendix A contains information on the 
sample, method, and results of the study.  
Based on the findings of the pilot study, in the present study cognitive style was assessed 
with the Cognitive Style Index (CSI, Allinson & Hayes, 1996). The measure contained 38 
true/uncertain/false questions. Twenty-two items were worded such that a true response indicated a 
preference for rational style and 16 items were worded such that a true response indicated a 
preference for intuitive style (i.e., were reverse scored). Two points were given to rational responses, 
0 points to intuitive responses, and 1 point to uncertain responses. Therefore, the theoretical 
maximum for the scale was 76 and the minimum was 0. In the present sample (n = 126), CSI scores 
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ranged from 10 to 74, the mean score was 43.58, and the internal consistency reliability estimate was 
.88. See Appendix B for items.   
Perspective taking. Perspective taking was assessed using the Perspective Taking subscale 
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). The Perspective Taking scale, “assesses the 
tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others” (pp. 113-114). It 
contained seven items rated on a 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well) scale. In 
the present sample (n = 126), perspective taking scores ranged from 2 to 28, the mean score was 
17.46, and the internal consistency reliability estimate was .77. See Appendix C for items.   
Task conflict. Task conflict was assessed using four items adapted from Jehn’s (1994, 1997) 
relationship conflict scale and used in Hinds and Mortensen (2005). Items were rated on a five-point 
scale with anchors 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). In the present sample (n = 123), task conflict scores 
ranged from 4 to 18, the mean score was 9.17, and the internal consistency reliability estimate was 
.80. See Appendix D for items.   
Affective conflict. Affective conflict was assessed using six items adapted from Jehn’s 
(1994, 1997) relationship conflict scale and used by Hinds and Mortensen (2005). Items are rated on 
a five-point scale with anchors 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). In the present sample (n = 123), 
affective conflict scores ranged from 6 to 27, the mean score was 7.93, and the internal consistency 
reliability estimate was .86. See Appendix D for items.   
Task schema congruence. Task schema congruence was assessed using the Adaptive 
Structured Knowledge Assessment (Rentsch, 2006). The ASK Assessment was developed to ensure 
the content of the task schema measure was relevant to each particular team. There were two main 
steps to the ASK Assessment: a recall procedure and a sorting with paired comparison procedure. 
The recall, sorting, and paired comparison procedure is consistent with previous work assessing the 
congruence of team member’s cognitive representations of task information (see Rentsch et al., 
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2010). Members completed all parts of the ASK Assessment individually. First, following the team’s 
planning session team members were allowed 10 minutes to freely recall any of the information 
discussed during the interactions. They listed discrete pieces of information as words, phrases, or 
sentences (e.g., “SEALS teams are a Navy asset”; “Sunrise and sunset times”). These items 
contained pieces of a member’s own unique information, another member’s unique information, 
general information, or new ideas. Next, team members were allowed 3 minutes to review their list of 
information and to select the top 10 pieces of information that they felt were most important to the 
team for planning the mission. This procedure was designed to ensure that the content used for the 
remainder of the ASK Assessment was information the team actually used while planning their 
mission. Because teams were free to discuss any information during their planning time, discussions, 
rescue plans, and recalled information were unique to each team. Therefore, teams were likely to 
develop schema congruence regarding the task based on their team’s own unique discussion. To 
assess the schema congruence of all teams using the same task stimuli would yield a measure with 
content that is potentially irrelevant to some teams. That is why the ASK Assessment requires that 
each team generate its own content for the task schema congruence measure (Rentsch, 2006). 
For each team, the 10 most important items each team member generated in step one (the free 
recall) were pooled to create a set of 30 items. Each information item was presented on electronic 
“cards” so that all team members had the same set of 30 cards on their computer screen. Still working 
independently, each team member sorted his/her information cards into “stacks” or categories of 
information represented by separate boxes on the screen. They were instructed to sort the information 
into categories according to the similarity of the information on each card. For example, a participant 
might have chosen to place information about helicopters into one category, and information about 
the stranded civilians into another category, etc. Participants then generated a label for each category. 
After creating these categories and labels, each team member independently rated the degree of 
similarity among each of the category labels using a paired comparison process. The computer 
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program presented the category labels in pairs until all possible pairs were presented. Team members 
rated the similarity of the information in the categories by selecting a number from an 11-point scale 
which ranged from -5 (very dissimilar) to +5 (very similar). The number assigned to each category 
pair was extrapolated to all cards contained within that category. Cards in the same category were 
assigned the highest rating of similarity. Therefore, for each team member, a 30 x 30 matrix was 
established that contained his or her similarity ratings of the team’s 30 information cards. For each 
team, the three team members’ similarity matrices were submitted to an individual difference 
multidimensional scaling analysis. This procedure is based on Euclidian distances and evaluated 
the distances between data points (pieces of information) for each team member’s matrix. It 
produced a measure of goodness of fit in the form of a R2. R2 represents the variance accounted 
for in the given data. A higher R2 corresponds to greater similarity in the teammate’s ratings, and 
was used as the index of task schema congruence. This method is consistent with past research 
(e.g., Rentsch, 1990; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001). In the present sample (n = 40), R2 values 
ranged from .43 to .99.  
Team performance.  Team performance was evaluated based on the written final plan 
submitted by the team. A scoring system was used to evaluate several aspects of the quality of the 
team’s plan. High performance was evidenced by a plan that met requirements outlined in the team’s 
mission (e.g., rescue must be completed within 24 hours; forces are to avoid contact with the enemy), 
took into account vital elements of the information, integrated crucial pieces of information from 
various roles to reach proper conclusions, and met criteria for feasibility and efficiency. A 
standardized list of the most important aspects a team must consider, areas where connections 
between information existed, and particularly positive or negative actions a team could have taken 
were used to evaluate the final plans. Points were awarded or deducted for each item on the list. Four 
graduate students very familiar with the task assisted in refining the coding system. Seven final plans 
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were each coded by two such independent raters.  Each rater provided feedback and suggestions that 
were compiled into a set of scoring rules. Next, 10% of the final plans were coded by two 
independent raters using the scoring rules. The raters resolved discrepancies in their scoring by 
achieving consensus, which is consistent with Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, Milanovich, and Reynolds’s 
(2001) rating methods. Simple interrater agreement was 95%. Krippendorf’s alpha was .92 (Hayes & 
Krippendorf, 2007).  Acceptable alphas are .667 or above (Krippendorff, 2004).  Given the high 
levels of agreement on the scoring system, the remaining final plans were scored by only one rater.  
Three performance measures were calculated to capture different aspects of performance. 
The first metric represented the proportion of positive to negative decisions made in the rescue plan. 
This was calculated as the percentage of points awarded (for correct or positive actions) to points 
deducted (for incorrect or negative actions) which produced a percentage “good” score for each 
teams’ plan. Percentage “good” scores ranged from 38% to 94%. The second measure was based on 
an optimal plan produce by Navy SEALS (Biron et al., 2008). Each team’s plan was compared to the 
optimal plan and points were awarded or deducted based on similarity. “Optimal” plan scores ranged 
from -8 to 13 points. The final measure of performance was a completeness score. There were twelve 
portions of the plan teams were required to complete (e.g., “What mode(s) of transportation will the 
SEALS use to get to the island?”; “What time will they leave the island?”). Teams were awarded 1 
point for completing each part of the final plan sheet and scores ranged from 2 to 12 points.  
Procedure  
The proposed study was part of a larger study.  Participants signed up for the study via the 
online system described above. Data was collected from participants in two phases. In the first phase, 
participants were provided a link to an online survey which contained the CSI, perspective taking, 
and demographic items. Participants were required to complete these measures at least 48 hours 
before participating in the remainder of the study. This was done to prevent participants from altering 
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their behavior during the second phase because of nature of the items presented in the first phase. 
After completing the online measures, participants were assigned a time to come to the laboratory to 
complete the team portion.  Data from the surveys was linked to the laboratory participants using an 
alphanumeric code. Two participants completed the surveys in Phase 1 twice. For these participants, 
their two sets of survey responses were averaged.  
In the second phase, participants came to the laboratory to complete the rescue mission 
planning with two other participants (creating a three-person team). Upon entering the laboratory, 
participants granted their informed consent and were assigned to a team and role. Then, teams 
received a task overview. Teams were given training on how to use the communication software on 
their individual computers. This software allowed the three members of the team to chat about the 
task (share information, develop ideas, etc.) during their mission planning time. Next, team members 
reviewed the information packets independently for 35 minutes. After a short break, members were 
reassembled and read a short statement regarding their role’s expertise aloud to their teammates. The 
experimenter then explained the final plan sheet that the team needed to complete with the details of 
their rescue plan. Team members were escorted to their individual workstation (computer and desk) 
that were connected virtually with their teammates’ computers. Teams were allowed 60 minutes to 
chat electronically with their teammates about the task and to complete the teams’ written final plan 
sheet. Following the task, teammates were allowed 2 minutes to review the official plan submitted by 
the selected member. Then, teammates completed the first step of the ASK Assessment by recalling 
and selecting the top 10 pieces of information from the team’s discussion as described above. 
Following a short break, during which they were forbidden from speaking, members independently 
completed the remainder of the ASK Assessment by sorting (categorizing), labeling, and rating the 
similarity of information generated in the first step. After completion of the ASK Assessment, 
participants completed the affective and task conflict scales. Then participants were debriefed and 
paid for their participation.  
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Results 
Preliminary Scale Analyses 
Internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) estimates for the CSI, perspective 
taking, task conflict, and affective conflict are reported above and each estimate reached 
acceptable levels.  
In order to determine if the self-report and perceptual variables were distinct constructs, 
factor analysis was conducted with the items from the cognitive style, perspective taking, task 
conflict, and affective conflict scales at the individual level. A confirmatory factor analysis with 
maximum likelihood estimation was used. The approach was to construct and compare two 
models: a null model and a four-factor model. The null model was used to test the assumption 
that a single factor (i.e., self-report method) underlay the data and all indicators (survey items) 
were fully free to inter-correlate. The second model was a four-factor model and was based on 
the assumption that the indicators (survey items) are associated with the four constructs, 
cognitive style, perspective taking, task conflict, and affective conflict. Because affective and 
task conflict were expected (and have been shown, Jehn et al., 1999) to be interrelated, these two 
were allowed to correlate in the specified model. They were specified to be uncorrelated with 
cognitive style and perspective taking, which were specified to be uncorrelated with each other. 
In order to show that the data represent four distinct constructs, the fit of the null model and four-
factor model were compared. Evidence in favor of the four-factor model would show that, a) the 
four-factor model was good fit to the data and, b) the four-factor model was better fit to the data 
than the null model. Two fit indices, chi-square and the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), were used to compare the models. Chi-squared is an assessment of overall model fit 
and tests if deviations in the observed fit from the proposed fit could be explained by random 
chance. Both the null model and the four-factor model showed χ2 probability levels < .001 
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suggesting that the deviations in observed fit compared to proposed fit were not due to chance. 
Chi-squared, although a useful statistic for initial summaries of model fit, has known problems 
such as over-sensitivity to sample size (Byrne, 2001; Loehlin, 2004). It is not uncommon for the 
χ
2 to suggest poor model fit while other fit indices suggest adequate or good model fit. For this 
reason, the second test of fit was the RMSEA. RMSEA takes into account sample size, model 
degrees of freedom, and the chi-square and essentially estimates how well the model can account 
for variation in the population rather than in the given sample. RMSEA values of < .10 are 
considered acceptable fit and < .05, excellent fit (Loehlin, 2004). In order to show that the 
measures are distinct the four-factor model needed to be a good fit to the data and also a better fit 
than the one-factor model. The four factor model had a RMSEA value of .06 showing that it was 
a good fit to the data. The RMSEA value of the one factor (null) model also showed an 
acceptable value of .09. However, the four factor model was a better fit to the sample data. 
Therefore, the remainder of analyses will consider cognitive style, perspective taking, and task 
and affective conflict to be separate constructs.  
Aggregation to Team Level  
Cognitive style. Separation diversity is indicated for a variable when observations fall 
along a continuum.  “Such differences reflect … horizontal distance along a single continuum 
representing dissimilarity in a particular attitude or value, for example” (Harrison & Klein, 2007, 
p. 1200). For the present study, three basic assumptions about separation diversity are that, a) 
members within team differ with respect to the variable (cognitive style), b) teams differ from 
one another in how dispersed members are along the variable continuum (in some teams, 
members will have scores that are close together whereas in other teams, members’ scores will 
vary widely), and c) differences between degree of dispersion are systematically related to other 
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variables (e.g., performance) (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Separation diversity is appropriately 
indexed by calculating absolute distances of individuals’ scores from the teams’ mean.  
In the present study, cognitive diversity was assessed as separation diversity.  Because 
the cognitive style measure (CSI) produces interval-level data, team cognitive style diversity was 
indexed with the within-team standard deviation.  Cognitive style diversity in the present sample 
(n = 42) ranged from 1.53 to 30.45 with an average value of 11.04. In addition to calculating 
each team’s cognitive style diversity, each team’s mean cognitive style was also calculated and 
used in preliminary analyses described below. Mean cognitive style (n = 42) ranges from 24.67 
to 56.67 with an average value of 43.57.  
Task conflict. In order to justify aggregation of the task conflict scale to the team level, 
adequate agreement between teammates as to the level of task conflict present in the team must 
be established. James, Demaree, and Wolf (1984) advocated the use of the within-group 
interrater reliability statistic for multi-item measures: rWG(J). This statistic compares the variance 
present in the observed responses to the variance that would be assumed under random 
responding. For the present scale a uniform distribution served as the comparison. The expected 
variance under a uniform distribution is σEU2 = (A2 -1)/12 where A = the number of alternatives 
on the response scale. For the current measure’s five-point likert scale this was calculated as (52 -
1)/12 or 2. Because task conflict is a four-item measure, Equation 1 will be used for evaluating a 
given team’s within team interrater reliability: 
           (1) 
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where  s = the observed variance for a given team. To the extent that teammates respond 
similarly to one another, the value obtained will approach 1.0, or perfect agreement. To the 
extent that teammates responded dissimilarly (they did not agree as to the level of task conflict) 
the value will be less than 1.0.  Sample-level average values above .70 are typically considered 
acceptable agreement to aggregate data to the team level (Zellmer-Bruhn et al., 2008). The 
average rWG(J) value for task conflict for the present sample was .73. Because there were some 
teams that did not have rWG(J) values above .70, tests of hypothesis regarding task conflict were 
conducted on the full sample and also a subset of the sample with acceptable agreement levels. 
The overall direction, magnitude, and significance of results was the same for both sets of data. 
Therefore, the entire sample was used in all tests of hypotheses.   
In addition to the rWG(J) statistic, an inter-class correlation coefficient (ICC) served as a 
further test to justify aggregation to the team level. ICC(1) is a test of the reliability of individual 
ratings compared to the team’s average. This is an appropriate statistic when raters (teammates) 
are nested within team and the within-team agreement is of primary interest (James, 1982). 
ICC(1) is, in essence, a form of analysis of variance that compares the within-team variability to 
the between-team variability. It tests that there is less variability in scores within a team than 
between the teams and can be calculated using Equation 2: 
           (2) 
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Where BMS = the between team mean square, WMS = the within team mean square and k = the 
number of teammates on a team (Shrous & Fleiss, 1979). Evidence that there is justification to 
aggregate within team task conflict scores is shown with a significant F- statistic at the p < .05 
level. Additionally, Lebreton and Senter (2008) advocate viewing ICC values similarly to effect 
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sizes such that, for example, a value of .05 could be viewed as a small effect, .10 a medium 
effect, and .25 a large effect (p. 838). In the present sample, the ICC(1) for task conflict was .15 
(p = .057). Although this did not quite reach significance, a value of .15 can be considered a 
“moderate” effect. This suggests that membership on a particular team contributed to the 
variance in ratings of task conflict on that team. In summary, the sample average rWG(J) was > .70 
and the ICC(1) could be interpreted as a moderate effect for group membership.   
 Affective conflict. Affective conflict scores were subjected to the same rWG(J) and ICC(1) 
statistics described above in order to test for adequacy of agreement before aggregating 
responses to the team level. The only difference was that affective conflict was a 6-item scale 
and thus, J = 6 in Equation 1 above. The average rWG(J) value for affective conflict for the sample 
was .87. Because there were some teams that did not have rWG(J) values above .70, tests of 
hypothesis regarding task conflict were conducted on the full sample and also a subset of the 
sample with acceptable agreement levels. The overall direction, magnitude, and significance of 
results was the same for both sets of data. Therefore, the entire sample was used in all tests of 
hypotheses.  The ICC(1) value for affective conflict was .16 (p = .04) suggesting a moderate and 
significant effect of group membership on ratings of affective conflict. The high average rWG(J) 
and significant ICC(1) for rating of affective conflict provide acceptable evidence to justify 
aggregating to the team level.  
Perspective taking. Perspective taking is an individual difference variable and therefore 
it is unnecessary to justify aggregation prior to averaging the team’s perspective taking scores. 
Because mean team level perspective taking had been shown to predict team level outcomes in 
previous research (Galinsky et al., 2008), the average perspective taking score for each team 
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served as the team’s perspective taking in analyses. The team level perspective taking scores (n = 
42) ranged from 9 to 24.33 with an average of 17.45.  
Tests of Hypotheses 
Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for all study variables are shown in 
Table 1. Hypotheses 1a-3 are listed below and were tested with linear regression using the 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) model. For all tests of Hypotheses a significance level of p < .05 
was be applied. 
H1a: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and task 
conflict. 
H1b: There will be a positive linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and affective 
conflict. 
H2: There will be a negative linear relationship between cognitive style diversity and the 
development of task schema congruence. 
H3: Cognitive style diversity will have a positive linear relationship with performance. 
According to Harrison and Klein (2007), when using separation measures of diversity it 
is prudent to first assess the mean-level effects before attempting to determine diversity effects.  
Therefore, as a preliminary control, tests of Hypotheses 1a-3 first included a test of the mean 
effect of cognitive style on the outcome variables task conflict, affective conflict, task schema 
congruence, and performance. Table 1 shows that there was a significant relationship between 
mean cognitive style and task conflict (r = -.36, p = .01). This was the only outcome variable 
related to mean cognitive style. To account for this relationship, the test of Hypothesis 1a was 
conducted in a hierarchical fashion with mean cognitive style entered into the regression 
equation in Step 1 and cognitive style diversity entered in Step 2. Step 1 showed that mean 
cognitive style accounted for 13% of the variance in task conflict (R2 = .13, p = .02). However, 
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the inclusion of cognitive style diversity in Step 2 failed to show a significant incremental 
improvement in the prediction of task conflict above that already accounted for by mean 
cognitive style (∆R2 = .013, p = n.s.). These results are shown in Table 2. Therefore, Hypotheses 
1a was not supported.  
 Because affective conflict was unrelated to mean cognitive style, the test of Hypotheses 
1b included only cognitive style diversity. Task conflict was regressed onto cognitive style 
diversity. The resulting R2 was not significant (R2 = .00, p = n.s.) therefore, Hypotheses 1b was 
not supported. Hypotheses 2 was tested by regressing schema congruence onto cognitive style 
diversity. The resulting R2 was not significant (R2 = .00, p = n.s.) therefore, Hypotheses 2 was 
not supported. A separate regression was conducted for each of the operationalizations of 
performance: percent good, optimal plan, and completeness. The result were not significant (R2 = 
.01,.01 .02, respectively, p = n.s.). Taken together, there was no support for Hypotheses 3.  
 Hypotheses 4a-c are listed below and were tested using moderated hierarchical multiple 
regression.  
H4a: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity 
and task conflict such that the positive relationship will be stronger under conditions of high 
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.  
H4b: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity 
and affective conflict such that the positive relationship will be weaker under conditions of high 
perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.  
H4c: Perspective taking will moderate the relationship between cognitive style diversity 
and task schema congruence such that the negative relationship will be weaker under conditions 
of high perspective taking than it will be under conditions of low perspective taking.  
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First, in accordance with Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003) perspective taking was 
mean-centered by subtracting the mean value from all observed values. This created a linearly 
transformed variable retaining all of its original distributional properties. Next, a series of 
regression equations were conducted to test the interaction effect of cognitive style diversity and 
perspective taking on the outcome variables (Cohen et al, 2003; Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). In 
Step 1 the outcome variable was regressed onto cognitive style diversity and perspective taking 
simultaneously. In Step 2 the outcome variable was regressed onto cognitive style diversity, 
perspective taking, and the cross product (interaction) of cognitive style diversity and perspective 
taking simultaneously. A significant F test for the change in R2 (∆R2) obtained from Step 2 
would indicate that the interaction makes a unique contribution to the explanation of variance in 
the dependent variable above and beyond the main effects.  
To test Hypothesis 4a, task conflict was first regressed onto cognitive style diversity and 
perspective taking simultaneously in Step 1. In Step 2, the cross-product of cognitive style 
diversity and perspective taking was included in the regression. The result of adding the 
interaction produced an increase in R2 (∆R2 = .03); however, this change was not significant. 
Therefore, Hypotheses 4a was not supported. Perspective taking did not moderate the 
relationship between cognitive style diversity and task conflict. These results are shown in Table 
3. 
Hypothesis 4b was similarly tested with affective conflict regressed onto cognitive style 
diversity and perspective taking in Step 1 of the hierarchical regression. In Step 2 the cross-
product of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking was also included in the regression. 
The inclusion of the interaction term in Step 2 increased the explained affective conflict variance 
from 1% to 16% and this change was significant (∆R2 = .15, p = .01). These results are shown in 
37 
 
Table 4. To aid in interpreting the direction and magnitude of the interaction effect, the simple 
slopes of the relationship between cognitive style diversity and affective conflict were plotted 
(Cohen, et al., 2003) at high and low levels of perspective taking. Given that there were no 
theoretical reasons to posit specific levels of perspective taking, the values of perspective taking 
selected were one standard deviation above and below the mean. The regression lines for high 
and low perspective taking are shown in Figure 2. Unfortunately, the relationships were counter 
to the hypothesized direction and therefore, there was no support for Hypothesis 4b.  
To test Hypothesis 4c, schema congruence was regressed onto cognitive style diversity 
and perspective taking in Step 1. In Step 2 the cross-product of cognitive style diversity and 
perspective taking was also included in the regression. The inclusion of the interaction term 
produced an increase in (∆R2 = .05); however, this change was not significant. Therefore, 
Hypotheses 4c was not supported. Perspective taking did not moderate the relationship between 
cognitive style diversity and schema congruence. These results are shown in Table 5.  
Post-Hoc Analyses 
 The formal hypotheses argued for linear relationships between cognitive style diversity 
and the outcome variables. Because no support was found for the linear relationships, one 
possible explanation is that the relationships are actually curvilinear. For example, it is possible 
that some cognitive style diversity increases performance but that too much cognitive style 
diversity hinders performance. For this reason, analyses were conducted to test for curvilinear 
relationships between cognitive style diversity and task conflict, affective conflict, schema 
congruence, and the three performance scores. First, a new variable was created representing the 
quadratic function by squaring cognitive style diversity for each team. Then, hierarchical 
regressions were conducted with cognitive style diversity entered in Step 1 and cognitive style 
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diversity plus the quadratic function entered in Step 2. No significant curvilinear relationships 
were found.  
Discussion 
 This primary purpose of this study was to explore the effects of cognitive style diversity 
in decision making teams on conflict, schema congruence, and performance. This represents a 
move from the individual level of analysis, which is typical in past research, to the team level, 
which has not been examined. A secondary purpose was to examine the moderating effects of 
perspective taking on these relationships. Cognitive style is an individual difference defined as 
one’s typical manner of gathering, organizing, and processing information. Diversity in team 
members’ cognitive styles was expected to create more conflict, decrease the team’s ability to 
develop schema congruence, and improve performance. Perspective taking was expected to 
decrease affective conflict, increase task conflict, and make developing schema congruence less 
difficult. Hypotheses were tested in data obtained from three-person distributed teams collected 
in a laboratory study using a high fidelity military task. No support was found for the 
hypothesized relationships. The main variable of interest, cognitive style diversity, displayed no 
significant relationships with any study variables. Perspective taking, the moderating variable, 
also did not demonstrate expected relationships.  
There are several possible explanations for the lack of anticipated findings in the present 
study.  The study was conducted to extend current research by examining the hypothesized 
relationships at the team level of analysis and by investigating them within the context of a 
complex decision task in a virtual communication environment. There is sound reasoning in 
defense of the study context as an advancement over past research contexts.  The complex task 
used in the present study, which included unique role information and a time constraint, is more 
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analogous and therefore more generalizable to that of work teams than previous studies which 
used simpler tasks such as the Winter Survival task (Volkema & Gorman, 1998). The virtual 
communication medium also closely approximated the trend toward virtual teamwork and 
communication in the workplace (e.g., Bosch-Sijtsema, Ruohomäki, & Vartiainen, 2009).  
However, the wide deviation of the present context from that of past cognitive style 
research may have contributed to the unexpected findings. Past research studied cognitive style 
in a correlational manner with other variables such as teaching style (Evan et al., 2008)  but no  
known studies have investigated cognitive style’s interaction with various decision context 
factors such as task type or team context factors such as interdependence.  The present task 
crossed multiple categories of task types (McGrath, 1984) for groups and teams. It is a 
“generating” task requiring planning future actions, a “choosing” task requiring a final decision 
that is compared to an optimal answer, and also a form of “cognitive conflict” task where various 
viewpoints must be combined. It is possible that the complexity of the task type created difficulty 
in parceling out the effects of cognitive style diversity on the other variables. Perhaps cognitive 
style diversity has different effects on the various sub-categories of task type. For example, 
maybe it increases idea generation but decreases viewpoint integration. It is possible that in 
simpler, less complicated research contexts the effects of cognitive style are clearer than in a 
more complex and realistic research environment and perhaps these advances in research context 
should have been approached more incrementally.  
 The addition of virtual communication to the task context added another layer of 
complexity which may have contributed to the unclear findings. Virtual communication is 
different from face-to-face communication in a number ways (Driskall, Radtke, & Salas, 2003). 
First, it qualitatively changes information sharing behavior. A recent meta-analysis of virtual 
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team communication found that as virtuality increased towards total virtuality (such as in the 
present study) teams shared more unique than common information but shared less information 
overall (Mesmer-Magnus, DeChurch, Jimenez-Rodriguez, Wildman, & Shuffler, 2011). Some 
explanations for these findings included that teams tended not to repeat information or “waste” 
time on common information due to the cumbersome nature of typing versus speaking and 
because the medium itself leaves a history of past information shared. It might be expected that 
changes in information sharing behavior may alter cognitive styles’ relationships with other 
variables because cognitive style affects how people search for and process information 
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Ruble & Cosier, 1990; Vance et al., 2007). In addition to its effects on 
information sharing, virtual communication is well-known to inhibit important communication 
cues related to expressing and interpreting meaning, feelings, and understanding (Driskall et al., 
2003; Thompson & Coovert, 2003). This is often referred to as “degrading” the quality and 
richness of the teams’ communication relative to face-to-face or less virtual (e.g., video 
conferencing) environments (Mesmer-Magnus et al., 2011). It is possible that the ability to 
perspective take is altered or hindered by virtualness. Although no research to date has explicitly 
tested the effects of virtualness on perspective taking ability, related research exists. For 
example, Bertacco (2007) found that when participants were expecting e-mail communication 
from another person they engaged in less perspective taking than when expecting handwritten 
ground mail communication. Therefore, the virtual communication medium used in the present 
study may have impacted participants’ ability or willingness to engage in perspective taking 
during the task. In summary, the complexity of the task and virtuality of the communication 
medium may have overwhelmed team members’ typical decision making and perspective taking 
behavior altering expected relationships.  
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In the same way that the task context may have contributed to the unexpected findings 
with respect to cognitive style diversity, it may have also been a factor in the unanticipated 
results for perspective taking. One contribution of the present study was to extend perspective 
taking research into different contexts. Therefore, necessarily the present context differed from 
past research and the findings may show that this different context is not analogous to past 
contexts. Past research on perspective taking has been largely conducted in negotiation situations 
where the interest was in whether the parties came to decisions that benefited both sides but not 
whether their decisions met external criteria of effectiveness or correctness (Kemp & Smith, 
1994). In these scenarios, seeing the other’s perspective led to willingness to create mutual 
cooperative outcomes rather than competitive ones. In the context of the present study, the 
objective was to create the best solution, not necessarily the solution that incorporated 
everyone’s ideas or suggestions. In other studies, perspective taking was manipulated or trained 
(Falk & Johnson, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Sessa, 1996) rather than self-reported. In these studies, 
the notion of perspective taking and/or benefits of perspective taking was made salient to 
participants. In the present study, it was not suggested to participants that they should engage in 
perspective taking. In fact, participants took the perspective taking measure days in advance of 
performing the task to minimize any priming effect. It is possible that effects for perspective 
taking are most prominent when performing perspective taking behaviors is strongly encouraged 
through manipulation or training. Therefore, these differences between the present and past 
research might explain the unanticipated findings. A final possible explanation is that although 
the self-report measure used in the present study (Davis, 1983) has a long history of use in 
research, other measures of perspective taking may be more accurate. Recently Park and Raile 
(2010) found no relationship between self and other ratings of perspective taking using the Davis 
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(1983) measure suggesting that people may not be very accurate judges of their own perspective 
taking abilities.  
Although the hypothesized relationship were not supported in the present study, notable 
and interesting findings did emerge from the study. For example, task and affective conflict were 
related in several ways to other study variables. Task conflict was negatively correlated with 
mean cognitive style indicating that more rational teams had less task conflict. People with a 
rational cognitive style prefer to engage in a detailed, linear decision making process (Vance et 
al., 2007). If all members were more rational than intuitive, they may have agreed that a 
methodical, linear approach to the task was best and therefore, may have experienced less 
conflict about the decision making method. On the other hand, intuitive people jump to 
conclusions and rely on their gut-instincts (Hough & ogilvie, 2005). If each intuitive teammate 
came into the task discussion with his/her own notions about the best solution, this may have 
caused friction and disagreements about how to perform the mission.  
Task and affective conflict had several other interesting relationships that would be 
expected based on the literature. First, task and affective conflict displayed a significant positive 
correlation with each other. This finding is consistent with past research on team conflict which 
has shown that although people are capable of mentally separating task and affective conflict, 
there is often a “bleed over” effect (Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999). For example, criticisms 
of ideas and suggestions may become emotional, and personality clashes may turn to criticisms 
of substantive ideas. The .59 correlation between task and affective conflict found in the present 
study is consistent with the .54 correlation found in a meta-analysis of intra-group conflict (De 
Drue & Weingart, 2003). Therefore, the direction and magnitude of this relationship was 
expected.  
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In general, the present study found that higher conflict was related to lower performance. 
Task and affective conflict were negatively related to performance measured as completeness of 
the team’s rescue plan and performance measured as percentage of “good” or correct rescue plan 
decisions. These relationships are consistent with recent meta-analytic findings which showed a 
steady negative relationship between affective conflict and team outcomes including 
performance (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2011). This meta-analysis also found that when the 
association between task and affective conflict was strong within a study, and when the study 
was conducted in a laboratory setting, task conflict was related to poorer performance. An earlier 
meta-analysis similarly found a consistent negative relationship between task conflict and team 
performance (De Drue & Weingart, 2003). Therefore, the findings in the present study regarding 
the relationships between conflict and performance are consistent with those found in past 
research. 
A final relationship found in the present study was between schema congruence and 
performance as compared to the optimal plan. Task schema congruence refers to the similarity of 
teammates’ cognitive representations of task information which can be similar with respect to the 
content and structure of that information (Rentsch & Hall, 1994). The more similarly teammates 
mentally categorized and organized information related to the task, the closer their final rescue 
plan came to the optimal plan developed by Navy SEALS. The finding that teams whose final 
plans most closely approximated the optimal plan provided by subject experts is similar to other 
findings that suggest experts’ schemas tend to converge and show greater similarity than do 
schemas produced by novices (Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 1994). It seems that in the present 
study, when teams were able to produce a plan of near optimal “expert” quality, they also 
developed task schemas that were similar. The relationship between schema congruence and 
44 
 
performance is well-supported in the literature (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). It has 
been found that some of the mechanisms through which task schema similarity may facilitate 
high performance is by increasing the teams’ ability to communicate about the task and 
coordinate their actions to accomplish the task (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, and Cannon-
Bowers, 2000). The direct effects of cognitive similarity on team performance have also been 
demonstrated empirically (Lim & Klein, 2006; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Salas, 2005) and across studies in a recent meta-analysis (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). 
In summary, although the present study did not find support for the hypothesized relationships, 
other interesting relationships were uncovered that add to or support the literature on decision 
making teams.  
Contributions 
The literature from several disparate areas of research was synthesized in the conceptual 
framework shown in Figure 1. The framework offered a cross-disciplinary perspective and 
advanced theoretical understanding of interrelatedness amongst the research in several sub-
disciplines of psychology including social, educational, counseling, and industrial-
organizational, and several areas of management including managerial/organizational cognition, 
organizational behavior, and human resources.  The framework contributed to these literatures by 
illustrating how cognitive style research can be extended beyond the individual level to the team 
level. It also addressed the calls in the team diversity literature to move beyond demographic 
diversity toward cognitive types of diversity (van Kippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Additionally, 
the previously unrecognized role of perspective taking to team diversity and cognitive style was 
integrated into the framework.  
 The present study contributes to theory and research by demonstrating appropriate multi-
level research techniques. In this study a construct typically associated with the individual level 
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of analysis was examined at the team level of analysis. According to Chan (1998) this represents 
an elemental type of composition, one in which data from a lower level (individual cognitive 
style) is used as a basis for a higher level construct (team cognitive style diversity). “In other 
words, the higher level construct is of a collective or aggregate nature and is construed as some 
form of combination of the lower level units” (Chan, 1998, p. 235). Multi-level data issues to 
consider include the functional relationship between the levels, maintaining the integrity and 
validity of the construct across levels, and the manner of aggregation (Chan, 1998). Five 
composition models exist. Cognitive style diversity is best described in Chan’s typology by the 
“dispersion” model. In the dispersion model it is the variance of scores at the lower level that is 
of interest. This is in contrast to, for example, the “direct consensus” model where agreement at 
the lower level is of interest and variance is viewed as error. When it is precisely this variance, or 
diversity, in scores that is the value of interest, selecting the appropriate diversity 
conceptualization is critical to proper operationalization. Harrison and Klein (2007) discussed 
three configurations of group diversity and the appropriate statistic for aggregation in each 
instance. For example, diversity of a categorical variable such as sex, is necessarily aggregated 
differently than a continuous variable. Cognitive style diversity represents “separation” diversity 
where team members vary in points across a continuum of scores. Separation diversity is best 
indexed by a measure of distances between pairs of team members on the cognitive style 
measure (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Appropriate indices include within team standard deviation 
(as used in the present study) and average Euclidean distances. In summary, when a researcher is 
interested in a phenomenon at the team level and that construct is most appropriately measured at 
the individual level he or she must remain cognizant of maintaining congruence between the 
measure and the aggregate as to not distort the construct across the levels. The present study 
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contributed to future cognitive style diversity studies by outlining this process properly and 
providing an exemplar for continuing this stream of research.  
The limited findings from this study also contribute to research on teamwork, team 
cognition, and virtual communication. Somewhat mixed evidence has accumulated in the 
literature regarding team conflict. Convergence is found in support of affective conflict being 
generally negative for team processes and outcomes (De Dreu & West, 2001). However, the role 
of task conflict is less agreed-upon. Many researchers have posited that task conflict, especially 
in a decision making scenario, would lead to improved performance due to a greater variety of 
ideas exposed and the avoidance of negative processes like groupthink (De Drue & Weingart, 
2003). The present study found that conflict, in both its forms, was related to lower team 
performance and decision quality. It appears that in the specific context of an ad hoc decision 
team, working virtually under time constraint, conflict may impede performance. Conversely, 
this study found that cognitive similarity was related to improved performance and decision 
quality that more closely approximated expert quality. This finding contributed to the growing 
body of evidence supporting the connections between team cognition and performance 
(DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). If in fact the lack of anticipated findings in the present 
study can be traced in part to the virtual nature of the communication medium, this may have 
implications for virtual teamwork. Virtual contexts may change our capabilities to perspective 
take and alter the nature of information sharing in decision making.  
Limitations 
As with any study, the present study had constraints and trade-offs which imposed 
limitations. It was determined that, given the novel nature of the research, a laboratory setting 
would allow for control over extraneous factors. Laboratory settings provide the ability to ensure 
high levels of internal consistency through randomization, careful monitoring, and scripted 
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procedures. This diminishes the effects of between-team differences in variables unrelated to the 
study. However, for all of the advantages provided by a laboratory setting, there are constraints 
associated with it. Locating adequate laboratory space and enticing participants are primary 
concerns but these can be ameliorated somewhat easily in the educational and research-friendly 
environments of a university setting. In the present study university students were selected as the 
sample because the study variables were individual differences associated with all typical adults.  
The use of university students has advantages and disadvantages. Two advantages include that 
they are readily available, and they can be motivated to participate by external incentives. In the 
present study, students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses were required to participate 
in five hours of research to fulfill their course objectives. This provided motivation to participate 
in the present study but also imposed the constraint that students would be unlikely to participate 
in the study if more than five hours was required. Additionally, available participants were 
limited to those enrolled in a given semester and this study competed with others for the fixed 
pool of participants. Therefore unavoidably this study was limited to one hour’s worth of pre-
session surveys and four-hours of laboratory time. A finite amount of individual and team data 
could be collected in this time frame while allowing adequate time to complete the task. 
Therefore, two limitations were the inherent constraints on time and amount of information that 
could be collected from each participating team and individual. With more time, additional 
variables might have been included that would have allowed for a wider ability to test or probe 
the proposed relationships and to uncover unanticipated relationships. 
The final sample consisted of 126 participants in three-person teams which yielded a 
team sample size of 42. This sample size is consist with, and even surpasses, that of past teams 
research (e.g., Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001). However, it still constrains statistical power to 
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find relationships. This is underscored when considering the magnitude of some relationships 
found in the present study that did not reach traditional levels of significance. Therefore, the 
sample size restriction on statistical power was a limitation of this study. Some final limitations 
concern measurement. Specifically, the self-report nature of several of the main variables and 
issues with compounding unreliability are possible limitations. Self-report measurement is often 
criticized for such characteristics as transparency, fakability, and lacking reliability (Chan, 
2009). The pilot study conducted in preparation for the present study took these factors into 
account and these results were considered in the selection of the self-report measures used. 
Additionally, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted and showed the distinctness of the 
constructs. None-the-less, alternative forms of measurement may also be appropriate, and 
possibly more accurate, for the variables in this study. Additionally, it is not clear how 
unreliability in the predictor, cognitive style, may be compounded when composed to the team 
level using the standard deviation. In the present study, the Cognitive Style Index had a internal 
consistency reliability estimate of .88. This is considered acceptable and even high reliability 
(Nunnally & Bernstein). However, without additional evidence of its reliability such as test-retest 
it may not be clear how small issues with unreliability are multiplied when combined using the 
standard deviation.  
Future Research  
Given the present findings, the path is open for future studies to replicate and extend this 
line of research. Several broad directions in which future research could proceed include 
studying team cognitive style diversity with other task types or environmental contexts, 
investigating its relationships with other process or outcome variables, and testing alternative 
operationalizations or measurement techniques. The present study was conducted in a laboratory 
setting with university students which may pose constraints on generalizing to working 
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populations and environments. Therefore, future research should test the proposed relationships 
in other teamwork contexts. One possible avenue is in the area of teams in new venture creation 
with a focus on team cognition and decision making (West, 2007). Evidence has shown that 
cognitive style diversity in these situations may affect strategic decisions. Cognitive style has 
been associated with entrepreneurial self-efficacy and showed that rational and intuitive styles 
contribute differently to the various functions (e.g., identifying opportunities, marshalling 
resources) of the new venture process (Kickul et al., 2009). This may suggest that a 
complementary blend of styles is necessary to cover all aspects of the process. Cognitive style 
has also been associated with differences in the assessment of risk in decision making 
(Henderson & Nutt, 1980) and in the quantity and quality of strategic business decisions (Hough 
& ogilvie, 2005). Therefore, future research could investigate new venture teams’ cognitive style 
diversity and their decision processes and outcomes.    
Above it is noted that the present task and element of virtual communication may have 
contributed to the unexpected lack of findings. Future research should consider closely the task 
to communication medium fit. Although the task used in this study was highly realistic and 
therefore generalizable outside of the laboratory, the additional of the virtual communication 
medium may have been less realistic. The extent to which crisis decisions are made using virtual 
communication is not known. Future research could incorporate “richer” mediums such as 
teleconferencing which might more closely approximate how these types of decisions are made 
in the real world. Similarly, the type of information presented in the task might have been too 
foreign for undergraduates to grasp fully. For this reason, future research should consider the 
sample to task fit and make alterations to maximize their compatibility. It might be possible to 
use a sample with more military knowledge or a task more suited to the know base of 
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undergraduates. Another avenue for future research is in testing the relationship between team 
cognitive style diversity and alternative types of team cognition. Although a relationship between 
cognitive style diversity and task schema congruence was not found in the present study, it is 
possible that cognitive style diversity affects forms or content of team cognition other than 
congruence of task information. Teams may develop many forms of cognition about their work 
together and these forms of cognition can be about different types of content (Rentsch, Small, & 
Hanges, 2008). For example, Mathieu et al. (2000) suggested that at least one other model of 
cognitive content exists in addition to the task model and called it the teamwork model. They 
explained that a teamwork model contains content about how the teammates interact, their roles 
and responsibilities, and each other’s knowledge and skills. Rentsch et al. (2008) delineated 
several different forms of cognition including perceptual, structured, and interpretive. Rentsch, 
Delise, and Hutchison (2010) also discussed various forms of congruence such as similarity and 
complementary forms. Additionally, other general categories of team cognition in exist.  
Transactive memory (Austin, 2003) is a concept which is concerned with awareness of and 
ability to retrieve each other’s expert knowledge. Cross-understanding is concerned with the 
accuracy of teammate’s understanding of each other’s mental models (Huber & Lewis, 2010). 
Therefore, simply because cognitive style diversity did not have a significant effect on task 
schema congruence in the present study, does not mean it may not have effects on other types of 
team cognition. Future research could investigate the relationship between cognitive style 
diversity and other forms, content, and/or categories of team cognition.   
Future research could also explore alternative measurement and operationalizations of the 
present study variables. In the present study, diversity was measured as an individual difference 
variable and aggregated to the team level. This technique measured diversity on the variable 
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directly but did not assess the extent to which this diversity was experienced by the team. 
Harrison and Klein (2000) suggested that perceived diversity may have more explanatory power 
than actual diversity because perceptions of the social environment are often better predictors of 
behavior than the objective environment. Others have similarly suggested that subjective 
experience of diversity is more likely to explain other subjective experiences in teams such as 
conflict than are more objective measures of diversity (Garcia-Prieto, Bellard, & Schneider, 
2003). Therefore, measures could be created that assess the extent to which team members 
perceive they have different cognitive styles. A measure could take the form of a multi-item 
survey addressing the various parts of cognitive style such as information gathering, organizing, 
and processing and be conducted in a round-robin fashion where each teammate rates their 
perceived similarity in cognitive style to each other teammate. Different measurement techniques 
could likewise be applied to the perspective taking construct. Some success has been found with 
other-ratings (as opposed to self-ratings) of perspective taking such as the relationship Park and 
Raile (2010) found between other-rated perspective taking and communication satisfaction. 
Reimer (2001) measured perspective taking by assessing the accuracy of predictions about 
another’s future actions. Therefore, future studies could assess perspective taking with different 
measures such as other member ratings of perspective taking or an objective criteria of accuracy 
about another’s perspective. 
Conclusion 
 Cognitive style varies between individuals and can therefore create diversity within a 
team. Because cognitive style has traditionally been studied at the individual level of analysis, 
there was scant literature to draw upon in formulating expectations for the effects of cognitive 
style diversity in teams. However, a large body of research has accumulated on a host of other 
types of diversity in teams. As part of the present study, a framework in which cognitive style 
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was embedded was developed to organize the team diversity literature. Using this framework as 
a review of the literature on comparable types of diversity, hypotheses about cognitive diversity 
effects were extrapolated. It was expected that diversity in team member cognitive styles would 
affect task and affective conflict, the development of schema congruence, and performance. 
Additionally, perspective taking was anticipated to moderate these relationships. Hypotheses 
were tested in a laboratory study using three-person teams completing a simulated military 
planning mission while using computers to communicate. None of the hypotheses were 
supported. It was presumed that the study context differed too widely from that of past research 
to be analogous. However, the present study highlighted the need to study cognitive style 
diversity in other contexts, with different process or outcome variables, and/or with novel 
measurement techniques to illuminate further these relationships. This study serves as an initial 
step to what will hopefully be a productive line of future inquiry on cognitive style diversity in 
teams.  
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Rational and intuitive styles reflect differences in the way individuals gather and process 
information (Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Ridding & Cheema, 1991; Robey & Taggart, 1981; 
Sadler-Smith, 1998).  Research suggests that these styles are differentially associated with 
decisiveness (Hough & ogilvie, 2005), leader-member exchange relationships (Allinson, 
Armstrong, & Hayes, 2001), team leader behavior (Armstrong & Priola, 2001), teaching style 
(Evans, Harkins, & Young, 2008), entrepreneurship characteristics (Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & 
Whitcanack, 2009), and risk assessment (Henderson & Nutt, 1980).  To capitalize on 
rational/intuitive style differences in practice and research, reliable and valid measures must be 
used.  Therefore, the purpose of present study was to compare the construct validity evidence for 
measures of rational and intuitive style because the literature is lacking this evaluation.  
Rational and Intuitive Styles    
 Rational style, also referred to as analytic style and linear style, is characterized by a 
thorough search for facts and data, deliberate, logical information processing, and a focus on 
problem details when making decisions.  Hough and ogilvie (2005) wrote, “analytical 
processes… [are] slow, rule-based, and depend on high-effort systematic reasoning” (p. 426).  
Allison and Hayes (1996) stated that rational thinking "…refers to judgment based on mental 
reasoning and a focus on detail" (p. 122).  Vance, Groves, Paik, and Kindler (2007) defined 
“linear thinking style as a preference for attending to external data and facts, and processing this 
information through conscious logic and rational thinking…” (p. 170, italics in original).  
Intuitive style, also referred to as holistic style and nonlinear style, has been described as 
being based on internal feelings, a big-picture approach, little external data gathering, and fast, 
intuition-based decision making.  Hough and ogilvie (2005) wrote, “intuitive processes are fast, 
associative, and use low-effort heuristics” (p. 426).  Allinson and Hayes (1996) stated that 
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intuitive "…refers to immediate judgment based on feelings and the adoption of a global 
perspective" (p. 122).  Vance et al. (2007) noted, “holistic in nature, intuition is often the result 
of an automatic and unconscious assessment of the interrelated parts of a nonlinear system that 
scans the integrated “big picture” to point to appropriate decisions and new directions, rather 
than getting delayed and lost in the detailed analysis of a huge set of data” (p. 169).  
Theory and empirical research support the notion that people have a consistent preference 
for either a rational or intuitive style, but not both (Robey & Taggart, 1981).  Therefore, we 
expect positive relationships among rational style measures and positive relationships among 
intuitive style measures, but negative relationships between rational and intuitive measures. 
Rational measures evaluated in the present study were the Rational scale of the General 
Decision-Making Style instrument (GDMS, Scott & Bruce, 1995), the Linear and External scales 
of the Linear-NonLinear Thinking Styles Profile (LNTSP, Vance et al., 2007), and the Analytic 
and Directive scales of the Decision Style Inventory (DSI, Rowe & Mason, 1987; See Table 1).  
Intuitive measures evaluated were the Intuitive scale of the GDMS, the Nonlinear and Internal 
scales of the LNTSP, and the Conceptual and Behavioral scales of the DSI.  The Cognitive Style 
Index (CSI, Allinson & Hayes, 1996), which is scored such that high scores reflect rational style 
and low scores reflect intuitive style, was also included.   
Construct Validity Evidence  
Construct validity evidence includes indications of convergent relationships and expected 
relationships with variables in the nomological net (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  In the present 
study, convergent validity evidence was obtained by evaluating the intercorrelations among the 
style measures (as described above).   
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Evidence of predicted relationships with variables in the nomological net was also 
evaluated.  Specifically, rational style should be associated with conscientiousness and learning 
goal orientation.  Conscientiousness is characterized by organization, planning, carefulness, and 
deliberation (Clark & Schroth, 2010; Perry, Witt, Penney, & Atwater, 2010).  Learning goal 
orientation is characterized by a desire to develop one’s competence through acquiring new skills 
and mastering new situations (Vandewalle, 1997).  Rational style should be positively related to 
conscientiousness and learning goal orientation because rational style is characterized by a 
thorough search for data, detail-oriented problem solving, and careful, planned decision making, 
characteristics that highly conscientious and learning goal oriented individuals would exhibit.   
Intuitive style should be related to extraversion and self-monitoring.  Extraversion is 
described as engagement in one’s surrounding environment (Bolton, Becker, & Barber, 2010).  
Self-monitoring refers to the degree to which people regulate, through self-observation, the way 
they present themselves to others (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder, 1974).  Intuitive style 
should be positively related to extraversion and self-monitoring because individuals with an 
intuitive style also use a big picture approach to problem solving, including an understanding of 
the external environment.   
Rational and intuitive style should not be significantly related to agreeableness, openness 
to experience, emotional stability, perspective taking, self-esteem, social desirability, or 
psychological collectivism.  Agreeableness reflects a desire for social harmony and cooperation 
with others (Bolton et al., 2010).  Openness to experience is characterized by imagination, 
sensitivity, and a willingness to try new experiences (McCrae & Costa, 1983).  Emotional 
stability relates to the tendency to experience emotional swings or negative emotions (Perry et 
al., 2010).  Perspective taking is the inclination to “spontaneously adopt the point of view of 
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others” (Davis, 1980, p.114).  Self-esteem is a conscious global self-evaluation of one’s worth 
(Campbell, Eisner, & Riggs, 2010).  Social desirability is a measure of an individuals’ tendency 
to respond in a socially desirable manner (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), a response bias that 
should not exist for a valid style measure.  Psychological collectivism refers to the extent to 
which individuals emphasize relationships within and feel responsibility towards an in-group 
(Jackson, Colquitt, Wesson, & Zapata-Phelan, 2006).  These variables should be unrelated to 
rational and intuitive style because they do not directly relate to information gathering, 
organization, or processing.   
Method  
Participants 
Participants were 119 students from a large public university who received course credit 
for participation.  Participants were 42% female, 83% Caucasian, 74% upperclassman, 56% 
currently employed, and had a mean age of 20.9 years.   
Procedure 
 Participants were given two packets of measures that included informed consent 
information.  They were instructed to complete both packets at different times to avoid fatigue 
and to return the completed measures within seven days.  Participants were debriefed and 
awarded credit upon packet return.  Measures were ordered within each packet to vary construct 
and response format.   
Measures 
 Rational and intuitive style.  Four measures were used to assess rational and intuitive 
style.  The CSI contained 38 true/uncertain/false items that were scored 0 (intuitive), 1 
(uncertain), or 2 (rational) points, yielding a possible 0-76 range.  Internal consistency reliability 
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estimates have ranged from .84 to .92 (Allinson & Hayes, 1996).  The LNTSP contained a 5-item 
Linear/Nonlinear scale and a 8-item External/Internal scale, each consisting of pairs of stimuli 
containing one Linear (or External) option and one Nonlinear (or Internal) option.  Respondents 
distributed three points across each pair of items, which resulted in the Linear (External) and 
Nonlinear (Internal) responses being correlated -1.00.  Therefore, scores for only the Linear and 
External scales were used in the analyses, with scores ranging from 0-15 and 0-24, respectively.  
Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged from .70 to .78 for Linear and from .84 to 
.92 for External (Vance et al., 2007).  GDMS contained a Rational scale (four items) and an 
Intuitive scale (five items) with a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response scale.  
Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged from .77 to .85 for Rational and from .78 to 
.84 for Intuitive (Scott & Bruce, 1995).  DSI contained 20 questions, each with four responses, 
one response representing each style.  Respondents allocated 1, 2, 4, or 8 points to each option to 
indicate their likelihood of acting according to the represented style (Analytic, Conceptual, 
Directive, or Behavioral).  Split-half reliability estimates have ranged from .5 to .7 (Rowe & 
Mason, 1987).  Internal consistency reliability estimates for these measures in the present study 
can be found in Table 2.  
Nomological net variables.  Learning goal orientation was assessed with five items 
using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) response scale.  Internal consistency reliability 
estimates have ranged from .88 to .91 (Vandewalle, 1997).  The items were adapted to academic 
situations.  Conscientiousness and extraversion were each assessed with eight items using 1 (very 
inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate) response scale.  Internal consistency reliability estimates have 
ranged from .83 to .86 and .83 to .85, respectively (Saucier, 1994).  Self-monitoring was assessed 
with the Self-Monitoring Scale using 18 true/false items with a reported internal consistency 
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reliability estimate of .70 (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985).  Internal consistency reliability estimates 
for these measures in the present study can be found in Table 3.  
 Discriminant nomological net variables.  Agreeableness, openness to experience, and 
emotional stability were each assessed with eight items using a 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very 
accurate) response scale.  Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged from .81 to .85, 
.78, and .76 to .78, respectively (Saucier, 1994).  Perspective taking was assessed with seven 
items from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index using a 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 
(describes me very well) response scale.  Internal consistency reliability estimates have ranged 
from .71 to .77 (Davis, 1980).  Self-esteem was assessed with the 10-item Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1985) using a 1 (doesn’t describe me in the slightest) to 9 (describes 
me perfectly) response scale.  The reported internal consistency reliability estimate was .83 
(Campbell, Eisner, & Riggs, 2010).  Social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was assessed 
with 32 items using a true/false response scale.  The reported internal consistency reliability 
estimate was .75 (Holden & Passey, 2010).  Five dimensions of psychological collectivism 
regarding in-groups (preference, reliance, concern, acceptance of norms, and goal priority) were 
assessed with three items each using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response scale.  
Reported internal consistency reliability estimates were .86, .81, .90, .90, and .86, respectively 
for the subscales (Jackson et al., 2006).  Internal consistency reliability estimates for these 
measures in the present study can be found in Table 4.  Demographic information regarding age, 
gender, grade point average (GPA), class rank, and work experience was also assessed.   
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Results 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 2-4.  Partial correlations were examined in 
cases where demographic variables correlated significantly with study variables.  All correlations 
reported in parentheses below were significant at p < .05.   
Convergent Validity Evidence 
Evidence of convergent validity was obtained by examining the intercorrelations among 
the cognitive style assessments.  See Table 2.  We expected rational measures to correlate 
positively with one another, intuitive measures to correlate positively with one another, and 
rational measures to correlate negatively with intuitive measures.   
Results for CSI, Linear, External, Rational, and Intuitive were strong.  CSI correlated 
positively with Linear (.45), External (.49), and Rational (.55), and negatively with Intuitive (-
.46).  Similarly, Linear correlated positively with External (.55) and Rational (.41), and 
negatively with Intuitive (-.60).  External correlated positively with Rational (.49) and negatively 
with Intuitive (-.55).  Rational and Intuitive were negatively correlated (-.38).   
The DSI scales (Analytic, Conceptual, Directive, and Behavioral) were expected to 
correlate significantly with one another and with the other five scales.  Analytic correlated 
negatively with Conceptual and Behavioral (-.34 and -.58, respectively), but not positively with 
Directive.  Conceptual correlated negatively with Directive (-.34), but not positively with 
Behavioral.  Directive and Behavioral were negatively correlated (-.41).  Results for the Analytic 
scale were strong.  Analytic correlated positively with CSI (.40), Linear (.43), External (.41), and 
Rational (.45), and negatively with Intuitive (-.33).  Results for the Conceptual and Behavioral 
scales were mixed.  Conceptual correlated negatively with CSI (-.24) and Rational (-.20), but not 
negatively with Linear or External or positively with Intuitive.  Behavioral correlated negatively 
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with External (-.21) and Rational (-.21), but not positively with Intuitive or negatively with CSI 
and Linear.  Results for the Directive scale were poor.  We hypothesized that Directive would 
correlate positively with CSI, Linear, External, and Rational and negatively with Intuitive.  
However, it correlated positively with Intuitive (.33).   
Nomological Net Evidence 
We hypothesized that rational style would be positively related to conscientiousness and 
learning goal orientation and negatively related to extraversion and self-monitoring, with 
relationships in the opposite direction for intuitive style.  See Table 3.  
 Evidence for Linear was strong.  It correlated positively with conscientiousness (.31) and 
learning orientation (.30) and negatively with extraversion (-.21) and self-monitoring (-.34).  
 Evidence for the CSI, External, Rational, and Analytic scales was moderate.  CSI, 
External, Rational, and Analytic correlated positively with conscientiousness (.49, .29, .33, and 
.30, respectively) and negatively with self-monitoring (-.52, -.46, -.36, and -.30, respectively).  
Rational and Analytic were positively correlated with learning orientation (.22 and .24, 
respectively).  CSI and External were negatively correlated with extraversion (-.35 and -.28. 
respectively).    
Evidence for Intuitive was modest. It correlated positively with extraversion (.41) and 
self-monitoring (.38) but was not correlated with conscientiousness and learning orientation. 
Evidence for Conceptual, Directive, and Behavioral was poor.  There were no significant 
correlations for Conceptual and Behavioral, and Directive was unexpectedly positively 
correlated with self-monitoring (.31).   
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Discriminant Nomological Net Evidence 
 It was hypothesized that style would be unrelated to agreeableness, openness to 
experience, emotional stability, perspective taking, self-esteem, social desirability, and the five 
dimensions of in-group collectivism (preference, reliance, concern, norm acceptance, and goal 
priority).  See Table 4.   
Evidence for CSI and Analytic was strong.  Both were unrelated to agreeableness, 
openness to experience, emotional stability, perspective taking, self-esteem, social desirability, 
and the collectivism dimensions.  
Evidence for Linear, External, Rational, and Directive was moderately strong.  All four 
scales were unrelated to agreeableness, openness to experience, emotional stability, perspective 
taking, self-esteem, and three collectivism dimensions (reliance, concern, and norm acceptance).  
However, Linear and Directive were correlated with social desirability (.27 and -.33, 
respectively).  External and Rational each correlated with one of the collectivism scales – 
External with preference (-.29) and Rational with goal priority (-.30). 
Evidence for Intuitive and Conceptual was moderate.  Both were unrelated to 
agreeableness, openness to experience, perspective taking, self-esteem, and three of the 
collectivism dimensions (reliance, norm acceptance, and goal priority).  However, Intuitive was 
correlated with social desirability (-.25) and the collectivism dimension preference (.27) and 
Conceptual was correlated with emotional stability (.35) and the collectivism dimension concern 
(-.22).   
Evidence for Behavioral was modest.  It was unrelated to agreeableness, emotional 
stability, self-esteem, and four collectivism dimensions (preference, concern, norm acceptance, 
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and goal priority).  However, it was correlated with openness to experience (-.22), perspective 
taking (.22), social desirability (.30), and the collectivism dimension reliance (.25).   
Discussion 
Evaluation of Each Measure  
Useful measures of rational and intuitive styles should be reliable, correlated with 
predicted nomological net variables, uncorrelated with discriminant variables, free of social 
desirability bias, uncorrelated with demographics variables, and should have a reasonable length, 
response format, and an identifiable context for use.  Below, we offer recommendations for each 
measure based on these characteristics.  A summary is also presented in Table 5.  All measures 
except the DSI had acceptable internal consistency reliability estimates.  
The validity evidence for the CSI was strong.  It demonstrated expected relationships 
with nomological net variables and discriminant variables, and was not significantly correlated 
with social desirability.  With respect to demographics, in the present sample it was positively 
correlated with GPA, possibly because typical academic assessments may favor the careful and 
deliberate nature of rational style, leading to higher grades.  The CSI is moderate in length.  The 
minimal missing data may be attributable to the response format.  Rows of identical answer 
bubbles may have led respondents to overlook some items.  Minor format changes (e.g., lines, 
increased spaces between items) may alleviate this problem.  CSI items are situated within a 
broad context with many work-related items.  The CSI would be useful for assessing rational and 
intuitive style in general circumstances and managerial contexts.  
The validity evidence for the LNTSP was also strong.  It demonstrated expected 
relationships with nomological net and discriminant variables, although the External scale was 
negatively correlated with social desirability.  The Linear and External scales were correlated 
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with GPA but not with other demographic variables.  The LNTSP has only 13-items.  However, 
approximately 10% percent of cases were missing because respondents’ ratings violated the 
instructions (pair ratings did not sum to 3), indicating possible problems with the response 
format or the instructions.  The LNTSP is the only measure evaluated in the present study that 
differentiated information gathering (External/Internal) from processing (Linear/Nonlinear).  
Therefore, the LNTSP would be appropriate for use in instances when both facets of style are of 
interest.  
The validity evidence for the GDMS was fairly strong.  The Rational and Intuitive scales 
generally correlated as expected with nomological net and discriminant variables.  However, 
fewer predicted relationships were confirmed with the Intuitive scale and it was correlated with 
social desirability.  Additionally, the Rational scale unexpectedly correlated negatively with class 
rank but, was unrelated to other demographic variables.  The GDMS has relatively few items and 
had the least missing data (1% or fewer missing items and cases).  The GDMS items were 
couched in the context of “important” decisions.  The GDMS might be considered to assess style 
when a lengthier measure is impractical, but it would require controlling for social desirability.  
The empirical evidence related to the DSI is relatively weak.  All scales except Analytic 
showed poor construct validity evidence, Directive and Behavioral correlated with social 
desirability, and Behavioral correlated with gender.  With an average scale reliability of less than 
.42 in the present study, the internal consistency reliability estimates were unacceptable.  The 
DSI is lengthy because using any scale requires responses to 80 stimuli.  Additionally, 17% of 
the cases were unusable because respondents’ ratings violated the instructions (did not use 1, 2, 
4, and 8 for their responses to each item).  The items were work-related and were designed for 
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use with managers.  Although the content of the DSI is commendable, given the empirical 
results, the DSI requires additional development before its use could be recommended.    
Limitations and Future Research 
The use of students in the present study may limit the generalizability of the results. 
However, 56% of participants held a job at the time of the study and 70% of those with jobs 
worked 20 hours per week or more.  Thus, participants had substantial job experience and were 
representative of some employed populations.  However, future research should evaluate these 
measures using samples from different populations (e.g., draw from various professions, 
experience levels, work contexts), which may reveal how the measures vary in their 
interpretation or applicability.  Evaluation of style in various populations might also reveal 
relationships between style and other organizationally-relevant outcomes.  Perhaps rational and 
intuitive styles lend themselves differently to various tasks.  Researchers have found that 
turnover, for example, was higher when a misfit between style and job demands existed (Chan, 
1996).  Other outcomes such as job satisfaction and performance might also be influenced by the 
interaction of style and work contexts.  Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies could provide 
insight into the stability or malleability of style.  For example, if experience with problem-
solving and decision making scenarios leads managers to feel more comfortable relying on 
global, intuition-based information processing, then intuitive style may be related to managerial 
experience. These are but a few possible fruitful paths for future style research.  
The variables in this present study were measured using self-reports.  Self-report data is 
often criticized as being fakeable, lacking reliability, and as producing invalid estimates of 
relationships with other variables (Chan, 2009).  However, several aspects of the present study 
mitigate these concerns.  The anonymity of the data and non-evaluative nature of the study 
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should have encouraged truthful responses (Chan, 2009).  The various response formats of the 
measures required participants’ attention and may have reduced the likelihood of such response 
biases as central tendency.  Furthermore, the constructs in the present study do not lend 
themselves well to objective measures.  They are most appropriately assessed using self-report 
methods, because they would not likely be more reliably captured using another measurement 
technique (Chan, 2009). Additional criterion variables such as peer ratings, time-to-decision, or 
schema structure could serve as alternative assessment approaches in future research.  
With respect to the style measures, self-report is the preferred method of assessing them 
due to the nature of the constructs and the inherent difficulties associated with the other methods.  
For example, it is cumbersome and expensive to assess the brain waves of many individuals with 
an EEG (Robey & Taggart, 1981).  Similarly, timed assessments or measures that must be sent 
for proprietary scoring are cumbersome to administer (Robey & Taggart, 1981).  The 
contribution of the present study was to evaluate several measures commonly used in I-O and 
related literature.  However, future research should extend measurement of rational and intuitive 
styles to behaviorally-oriented assessments.   
Conclusion  
The present study provides an evaluation of the construct validity evidence of measures 
of rational and intuitive styles.  Convergent, nomological net, and discriminant validity results 
showed the most support for the CSI, followed by the LNTSP and GDMS, and poor support for 
the DSI.  Reliability evidence, relationships with social desirability, and respondent difficulties 
with response format followed a similar pattern.  Future research should continue to examine 
measures of rational and intuitive styles and their influences on organizationally-relevant 
variables.   
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Table 1  
Cognitive Style Measures Categorization and Scoring. 
 
Measure Higher Scores Indicate Lower Scores Indicate 
Rational Style 
 
 
      LNTSP: Linear Scale  
More rational  
processing style 
 
Less rational  
processing style 
 
      LNTSP: External scale 
      GDMS: Rational scale 
      DSI: Analytic scale 
      DSI: Directive scale 
Intuitive Style 
 
 
      LNTSP: Nonlinear scale 
More intuitive  
processing style 
 
Less intuitive 
processing style 
 
      LNTSP: Internal scale 
      GDMS: Intuitive scale 
      DSI: Conceptual scale 
      DSI: Behavioral scale 
Rational and Intuitive Style 
 
 
      CSI More rational  
processing style 
More intuitive 
processing style 
 
 
86 
 
Table 2 
Correlations Among Cognitive Style Measures 
 
Variables M SD rxx 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. CSI 43.46 11.59 .82 - 
        
2. LNTSP: linear   7.67   2.65 .67  .45**a - 
       
3. LNTSP: external 15.28   3.35 .76 .49** .55**a - 
      
4. GDMS: rational 15.35   2.45 .80 .55** .41**a   .49** - 
     
5. GDMS: intuitive 17.32   3.20 .82 -.46**a -.60**a -.55**a -.38**a - 
    
6. DSI: analytic 79.71 15.89 .50  .40**  .43**a   .41** .45** -.33**a - 
   
7. DSI: conceptual 76.53 12.72 .24  -.24* -.20a  -.10 -.20*   .15a -.34** - 
  
8. DSI: directive 73.97 13.49 .32  -.14b -.20c  -.08b -.01b   .33**c  -.10b -.34**b - 
 
9. DSI: behavioral 69.80 16.54 .61   .02 -.08a  -.21*  -.21*  -.10a -.58** -.14 -.41**b - 
Note.  n ranges from 94-121 
aControlled for GPA 
bControlled for Age and Class 
cControlled for Age, Class, and GPA 
* p < .05, ** p < .01; two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3   
Nomological Net Correlations 
Variables Conscientious 
Learning 
Orientation Extraversion 
Self-
Monitoring 
CSI          .49**b         .06d        -.35**       -.52**e 
LNTSP: linear          .31**b         .30**d        -.21*a       -.34**f 
LNTSP: external          .29**b         .16d        -.28**       -.46**e 
GDMS: rational          .33**b         .22*d        -.11       -.36**e 
GDMS: intuitive         -.06b        -.18d         .41**a        .38**f 
DSI: analytic          .30**b         .24**d        -.14       -.30**e 
DSI: conceptual         -.10b         .02d        -.01       -.02e 
DSI: directive         -.12d        -.09d         .07c        .31**g 
DSI: behavioral         -.13b        -.15d         .01       -.10e 
rxx          .82         .80         .82        .72 
M      41.87     26.34     39.23    10.50 
SD        7.59       5.81       8.33      3.54 
Note.  n ranges from 97-120 
a Controlled for GPA eControlled for Gender 
bControlled for GPA and Age fControlled for GPA and Gender 
cControlled for Age and Class gControlled for Age, Class, and Gender 
dControlled for Age, Class, and GPA 
* p < .05, ** p < .01; one-tailed tests. 
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Table 4   
Discriminant Nomological Net Correlations 
Variables Agreeable Openness 
Emotional 
Stability 
Perspective 
Taking 
Self- 
Esteem 
Social 
Desire 
CSI     .07        .18        -.20e         .12     -.17        .15 
LNTSP: linear      .09a       -.03a         .17f         .18a       .23a        .27*a 
LNTSP: external    -.16        .06        -.11e         .01       .03        .16 
GDMS: rational      .03        .18        -.18e         .10       .03        .12 
GDMS: intuitive     -.04a       -.00a         .05f        -.23a     -.02a       -.25*a 
DSI: analytic     .06        .20        -.10e        -.00     -.10        .05 
DSI: conceptual     .00        .12         .35**e          .07       .14       -.05 
DSI: directive     -.17c       -.01c        -.22g        -.16c       .17c       -.33**c 
DSI: behavioral     .14       -.22*         .05e          .22*     -.03        .30** 
rxx     .83        .73         .81          .77       .83        .82 
M 44.63    42.20     37.27      17.53   32.22    15.29 
SD   7.15      6.21       8.17        4.98     4.55      5.64 
Note.  n ranges from 96-121.   
aControlled for GPA eControlled for Gender 
bControlled for GPA and Age fControlled for GPA and Gender 
cControlled for Age and Class gControlled for Age, Class, and Gender 
dControlled for Age, Class, and GPA 
* p < .05, ** p < .01; two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4  
Discriminant Nomological Net Correlations (Continued) 
Variables Collectivism 
 Prefer Reliance Concern Norms Goals 
CSI -.12 -.22f  .05 -.04 -.18e 
LNTSP: linear  .10a -.14f -.00a  .10a   .16f 
LNTSP: external   -.29** -.24f -.09 -.08   .02e 
GDMS: rational    -.06 -.22f  .06 -.04 -.30*e 
GDMS: intuitive    .27*a  .23f  .13a   .00a  -.04f 
DSI: analytic   -.07 -.22f  .17  -.05   .04e 
DSI: conceptual    -.07  .13f -.22*  -.13   -.02e 
DSI: directive    -.01c -.17g  -.02c   .03c    .09g 
DSI: behavioral      .13   .25*f   .03   .16   -.02e 
rxx      .81   .95   .85   .86    .68 
M    8.87  8.64 12.09 10.79    9.36 
SD    3.08  2.80   1.95   1.76    2.47 
Note.  n ranges from 96-121.   
aControlled for GPA eControlled for Gender 
bControlled for GPA and Age fControlled for GPA and Gender 
cControlled for Age and Class gControlled for Age, Class, and Gender 
dControlled for Age, Class, and GPA 
* p < .05, ** p < .01; two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Results 
 
  
 
Percent Missing 
 Percent of Expected  
Relationships Confirmed 
Scale 
Number 
of Items 
 
Items Cases1 
 
Nomological Net Discriminant  
CSI 38  <1 6  75 100 
LNTSP: linear 5  7 8  100 91 
LNTSP: external 8  5 9  75 91 
GDMS: rational 4  <1 1  75 91 
GDMS: intuitive 5  <1 1  50 82 
DSI: analytic 20  4 17  75 100 
DSI: conceptual 20  4 17  0 82 
DSI: directive 20  4 17  0 91 
DSI: behavioral 20  4 17  0 64 
1
 Because no missing data were replaced and scale scores were sums of item scores, a missing 
item in a scale resulted in a missing case for that scale 
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Appendix B 
People differ in the way they think about problems. Below are 38 statements designed to identify 
your own approach. If you believe that a statement is true about you, answer T. If you believe 
that it is false about you, answer F. If you are uncertain whether it is true or false, answer ?. This 
is not a test of your ability, and there are no right or wrong answers. Simply choose the one 
response which comes closest to your own opinion. Work quickly, giving your first reaction in 
each case, and make sure that you respond to every statement.  
 
Indicate your answer by completely filling in the appropriate oval opposite the statement: 
 
 
T   True          ?   Uncertain          F   False  
        
          T      ?      F        
 1. In my experience, rational thought is the only realistic basis for making  
 decisions.        0      0      0 
           
 2. To solve a problem, I have to study each part of it in detail.   0      0      0 
 
 3. I am most effective when my work involves a clear sequence of tasks to 
 be performed.        0      0      0 
 
 4. I have difficulty working with people who ‘dive in at the deep end’  
 without considering the finer aspects of the problem.    0      0      0 
 
 5. I am careful to follow rules and regulations at work.    0      0      0  
 
 6. I avoid taking a course of action if the odds are against its success.  0      0      0 
 
 7. I am inclined to scan through reports rather than read them in detail.  0      0      0 
 
 8. My understanding of a problem tends to come more from thorough  
 analysis than flashes of insight.      0      0      0 
 
 9. I try to keep to a regular routine in my work.     0      0      0 
 
10. The kind of work I like best is that which requires a logical,  
 step-by-step approach.       0      0      0 
 
11. I rarely make ‘off the top of the head’ decisions.    0      0      0 
 
12. I prefer chaotic action to orderly inaction.     0      0      0 
 
13. Given enough time, I would consider every situation from all angles.  0      0      0 
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14. To be successful in my work, I find that it is important to avoid hurting 
 other people’s feelings.       0      0      0                                                                       
          
15. The best way for me to understand a problem is to break it down into 
 its constituent parts.       0      0      0 
   
16. I find that to adopt a careful, analytical approach to making decisions 
 takes too long.        0      0      0 
 
17. I make most progress when I take calculated risks.    0      0      0 
 
18. I find that it is possible to be too organised when performing certain 
 kinds of task.        0      0      0 
 
19. I always pay attention to detail before I reach a conclusion.   0      0      0 
 
20. I make many of my decisions on the basis of intuition.   0      0      0 
 
21. My philosophy is that it is better to be safe than risk being sorry.  0      0      0 
 
22. When making a decision, I take my time and thoroughly consider all 
 relevant factors.        0      0      0 
 
23. I get on best with quiet, thoughtful people.     0      0      0 
 
24. I would rather that my life was unpredictable than that it followed  
 a regular pattern.        0      0      0 
 
25. Most people regard me as a logical thinker.     0      0      0 
 
26. To fully understand the facts I need a good theory.    0      0      0 
 
27. I work best with people who are spontaneous.    0      0      0 
 
28. I find detailed, methodical work satisfying.     0      0      0 
 
29. My approach to solving a problem is to focus on one part at a time.  0      0      0 
 
30. I am constantly on the lookout for new experiences.    0      0      0 
 
31. In meetings, I have more to say than most.     0      0      0 
 
32. My ‘gut feeling’ is just as good a basis for decision making as careful  
 analysis.         0      0      0 
 
33. I am the kind of person who casts caution to the wind.   0      0      0 
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34. I make decisions and get on with things rather than analyse every  
 last detail.        0      0      0    
 
35. I am always prepared to take a gamble.     0      0      0 
 
36. Formal plans are more of a hindrance than a help in my work.                 0      0      0 
 
37. I am more at home with ideas rather than facts and figures.    0      0      0 
 
38. I find that ‘too much analysis results in paralysis’.    0      0      0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Citation: Allinson, C. W., & Hayes, J. (1996). The cognitive style index: A measure of intuition-
analysis for organizational research. Journal of Management Studies, 33(1), 119-135; Higher 
scores represent more rational style; the following items are reverse scored: 7, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 
24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38).  
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Appendix C 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations.  For 
each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on the scale:  A, 
B, C, D, E, (where A = Does not describe me well and E = Describes me very well).  When you 
have decided on your answer, select the appropriate letter.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY 
BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as honestly as you can.  
 
Answer Scale: 
A   B  C  D  E 
             does not               describes me 
             describe                               very well 
           me well 
 
1. ____ I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy’s" point of view. 
2. ____ I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
3. ____ I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from  
         their perspective. 
4. ____ If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other   
         people’s arguments. 
5. ____ I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
6. ____ When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
7. ____ Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their  
         place. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Citation: Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a 
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113-126; 
Higher scores indicate more perspective taking; the following items are reverse scored: 1 and 4).  
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Appendix D 
 
Please answer the following questions about the extent to which differences in opinion and 
disagreements occur within the team. 
 
1 – Not at all 
2 –  
3 –  
4 –  
5 – Very much 
 
 
1. How frequently are there conflicts about ideas in the team? 
2. How much are personality conflicts evident in the team? 
3. How much tension is there among members in the team? 
4. How often do people in the team disagree about opinions regarding the work being done? 
5. How much friction is there among members in the team? 
6. How much emotional conflict is there among members in the team? 
7. To what extent are there differences of opinion in the team? 
8. How much conflict about the work you do is there in the team? 
9. To what extent do people take the arguments in the team personally? 
10. How much jealousy or rivalry is there among the members in the team? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Citation: Hinds, P. J., & Mortensen, M. (2005). Understanding conflict in geographically 
distributed teams: The moderating effects of shared identity, shared context, and spontaneous 
communication. Organization Science, 16(3), 290-307; Task conflict is represented by the 
following items: 1, 4, 7, and 8 where higher score equal more conflict; Affective conflict is 
represented by the following items: 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10 where higher scores equal more conflict 
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Table 1. Variable inter-correlations 
 x s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. CS Diversitya 11.04         6.79 -         
2. CS Meana, c 43.58   7.14 -.14 -        
3. Affective Conflict   7.93   2.12 -.04 -.05 -       
4. Task Conflict   9.17   1.87 -.07 -.36*   .59* -      
5. Schema Congruenceb     .79     .13  .02 -.13   .08 -.04 -     
6. Perspective Takinga 17.44   3.24  .07   .18  -.08 -.13  -.24 -    
7. Performance: Percent Good 73.75 11.53  .08   .05  -.23 -.39*   .16 -.25 -   
8. Performance: Optimal   4.71   4.76  .11  -.14  -.15 -.18   .29*  -.40*   .76* -  
9. Performance: Completeness 11.10   2.18  .14  -.02  -.32* -.37*   .13  -.04   .74*     .36* - 
n = 41 
a 
n = 42 
b 
n = 40 
c
 Higher scores are more 
rational 
           
 
 
Table 2. Hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity on task conflict controlling for the mean effect of cognitive style 
 Predictors B SE B β t r R2 ∆R2 Sig. 
Step 1      .36 .13 .13 .02 
 Mean Cognitive Style -.09 .04 -.36 -2.41     
Step 2      .38 .14 .01 .45 
 Mean Cognitive Style -.10 .04 -.37 -2.47    .02 
 Cognitive Style Diversity -.03 .04 -.12   -.76    .45 
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Table 3. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on task conflict 
 Predictors B SE B β t r R2 ∆R2 Sig. 
Step 1      .14 .02 .02 .69 
 Cognitive Style Diversity -.02 .04 -.06  -.37    .71 
 Perspective Taking -.07 .09 -.12  -.75    .46 
Step 2      .22 .05 .03 .28 
 Cognitive Style Diversity -.02 .04 -.08  -.47    .64 
 Perspective Taking -.27 .21 -.47 -1.31    .20 
 CSD x PT   .02 .02   .39  1.01    .28 
 
 
Table 4. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on affective conflict 
 Predictors B SE B β t r R2 ∆R2 Sig. 
Step 1      .09 .01 .01 .87 
 Cognitive Style Diversity -.01 .05 -.03 -.17    .87 
 Perspective Taking -.05 .11 -.08 -.48     
Step 2      .40 .16 .16 .01 
 Cognitive Style Diversity -.02 .05 -.07  -.43    .67 
 Perspective Taking -.57 .22 -.87 -2.63    .01 
 CSD x PT  .05 .02  .89   2.6     .01 
 
Table 5. Moderated hierarchical regression of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on schema congruence 
 Predictors B SE B β t r R2 ∆R2 Sig. 
Step 1      .24 .06 .06 .33 
 Cognitive Style Diversity .00 .00 .04 .22    .83 
 Perspective Taking -.01 .01   -.24 -.15    .14 
Step 2      .32 .10 .05 .18 
 Cognitive Style Diversity .00 .00 .05 .32    .75 
 Perspective Taking .01 .01 .19 .54    .59 
 CSD x PT .00 .00 -.46 -1.36    .18 
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Figure 1. The relationship between types of diversity, conflict, and the development of schema 
congruence 
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Figure 2. Interaction of cognitive style diversity and perspective taking on affective conflict 
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